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THE FABRICATED UNWIND DOCTRINE:
THE TRUE MEANING OF PENN V
ROBERTSONt
John Prebble* and Chye-Ching Huang**
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Taxpayers routinely rely on the unwind doctrine found in Internal
Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 80-58' when they discover that their
transactions have unwanted tax consequences. Nowadays, "unwinding"
has become a "common if not ubiquitous feature of tax practice."2  This
article finds that the unwind doctrine has no firm basis in case law.
Instead, the unwind doctrine is an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
fabrication based on the IRS' misinterpretation of the case Penn v.
Robertson.
Also referred to as the "rescission doctrine,"4 a tax "do-over,"5 or a
"tax mulligan,"' the effect of the unwind doctrine is that if you change your
mind about a transaction, you can avoid its income tax consequences by
returning to the economic status quo ante, so long as you do so by the end
t The authors gratefully acknowledge colleagues and correspondents who commented
generously on earlier drafts and who responded to questions. Some disagree with our conclusions,
several vehemently. We thank Karen Brown, Micah Burch, Michael Doran, David Hasen, Nancy
Kaufman, Tracy Kaye, Rick Krever, Henry Ordower, Peter Rose, Stephen Cohen, and Richard Vann.
The authors also thank Si Dong for her research assistance.
* BA, LLB (Hons) Auckland, BCL Oxon, JSD Cornell, Inner Temple, Barrister, Professor and
former Dean of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, Senior Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy
Research Institute, Monash University, Melbourne.
** LLB (Hons), BCom (Auckland), LLM (Columbia), Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law,
University of Auckland.
1. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
2. David Hasen, Unwinding Unwinding, 57 EMORY L.J. 871 (2008).
3. 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940).
4. David H. Schnabel, Revisionist History: Retroactive Federal Tax Planning, 60 TAX LAW 685,
686 (2007).
5. Richard W. Bailine, Rescission: A Federal Income Tax 'Do-Over', CORP. TAX'N, Nov.-Dec.
2005, at 32, 33.
6. Todd B. Reinstein, IRS OKs a Mulligan: Expands the Rescission Doctrine in Recent PLRs,
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP TAX UPDATE (May 3, 2007), http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/Tax0407.pdf
(discussing an analogy to the golfing practice that allows a golfer to retake a shot if she does not like the
outcome of the first attempt; the analogy is apt in the tax situation only where there is an unwind plus a
re-try, rather than simply unwinding a transaction without then attempting a similar transaction).
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of the tax year. In Unwinding Unwinding, Hasen explains that "in a
successful unwind, parties to a prior transaction or arrangement back out of
it by means of a later transaction and are treated for tax purposes as having
engaged in no transactions at all."' Schnabel illustrates the effect of the
doctrine with the example of a rescinded stock sale:8
... if A sells 100 shares of stock to B for $100 and, during the same
taxable year and before any dividends have been declared on the stock,
the transaction is rescinded such that A receives the stock back from B
and B receives the $100 back from A, A and B will generally be taxed as
though A held the stock for the entire time.
The Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, case law, and IRS
rulings do not refer to any unwind doctrine or rescission doctrine by name.
Commentators coined the appellation to describe the effect of rulings,
including many private letter rulings, in which the IRS has allowed
taxpayers to take the unwind approach. The IRS has allowed taxpayers to
use unwind treatment to erase from tax history not only tax effects, such as
the derivation of income from a sale of property,' but also tax effects such
as changes in entity status,' 0 the liquidation of a company,'1 and a
company's exit from a consolidated group.' 2 It has allowed unwind
treatment when the economic reversal was motivated by changes in
business conditions," and also in circumstances where the reversal was
motivated by tax outcomes that the parties later came to regret.14 It has
allowed unwind treatment not only when the unwind was legally connected
with the original transaction, such as a contractual payment rescinded for
mistake," but also where the two transactions were legally independent,
such as when two parties voluntarily reached a fresh agreement to reverse
the economic effects of a completed and legally independent transaction.' 6
The unwind doctrine is attractive to taxpayers because they can use it
to achieve better tax results than would otherwise be possible.
Transactions that cancel each other's economic effects will not
necessarily-absent the unwind doctrine have tax effects that also
cancel each other. For example, a taxpayer might derive taxable income,
but then pay that amount back later in the year. Without the unwind
doctrine, the outgoing in the second transaction will offset the tax effect of
the first only if it is deductible in its own right. If the outgoing is not
7. Hasen, supra note 2, at 871.
8. Schnabel, supra note 4, at 687.
9. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
10. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005).
I1. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007).
12. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-23-010 (June 5, 2009)
13. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005).
14. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007).
15. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
16. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007).
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deductible in its own right, the taxpayer will owe tax as a result of the two
transactions, even though she has economically returned to the status quo
ante. By contrast, under the unwind doctrine, both transactions would be
treated as if they had never occurred, regardless of whether the second
outgoing is deductible.
The IRS private letter rulings and consequent tax practice rely on
Revenue Ruling 80-58 as the source of the unwind doctrine." In turn,
Revenue Ruling 80-58 claims to find authority for its result in Penn v.
Robertson.
Despite many IRS rulings and despite taxpayers regularly adopting the
unwind doctrine, the authors know of no analysis of Penn v. Robertson that
convincingly shows that the case indeed supports the unwind doctrine.
Published analyses of unwinding focus on Rev. Rul. 80-58. When
commentators mention Penn v. Robertson at all, it is simply assumed to be
authority for the unwind doctrine, without any consideration of the
alternative interpretation of the case that this article argues is correct."
This article examines Penn v. Robertson closely in order to determine
its ratio. We find that Penn v. Robertson is not in fact authority for the
unwind doctrine. The IRS in Rev. Rul. 80-58 made two mistakes in
interpreting Penn v. Robertson."
First, the IRS mistakenly understood Penn as treating two transactions
within the same tax year, which returned the parties to the economic status
quo, as having never occurred. In fact, Penn v. Robertson simply allowed
taxable income derived in a year to be offset by a deduction generated later
in the same tax year. Penn v. Robertson does not sanction ignoring two
economically canceling transactions, nor does it transform an outgoing that
is not deductible in its own right, into a deductible expense.
The second mistake that the IRS made in Rev. Rul. 80-58 was to
appear to extend unwind treatment to cases where the second (unwind)
transaction has no legal connection to the first, rather than restricting it to
cases of true rescissions, that is where the second transaction is legally
connected to the first.
These mistakes came about because Revenue Ruling 80-57 and
subsequent private letter rulings made the classic error of confusing the
timing question of when a particular outgoing is deductible with the
17. Sheldon I. Banoff, New I.R.S. Rulings Approve Rescission Transactions That Change an
Entity's Status, 105 J. TAX'N 5, 5 (2006) ("[N]either the Code nor the Regulations give guidance as to
when a second (unwinding or rescission) transaction will be given effect, such that neither the first nor
the second transaction will be deemed to have ever occurred for federal income tax purposes."); see
also Joseph I. Graf ed., Application of the Rescission Doctrine to Issued Stock, 111 J. TAX'N 58, 58
(2009) ("The rescission doctrine is not part of the Code. The doctrine is derived from case law and
rulings, such as Rev. Rul. 80-58. .. )
18. E.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 897-902 (examines whether any principled normative basis exists
for unwinding but does not question whether the doctrine exists in law).
I19. See infra Parts IlL and IV.
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substantive question of whether the outgoing is deductible at all.
Penn v. Robertson was a "when" case. The issue was whether a
certain outgoing, undeniably deductible in its own right if incurred by the
taxpayer, should be taken into account for tax purposes in period one (when
the taxpayer Penn was alive) or in period two (after Penn's death). Penn v.
Robertson is authority for the ordinary proposition that an allowable
deduction can offset a taxable gain when both the gain and deduction occur
in the same tax year. It is authority that such an offset can occur even when
the (deceased) taxpayer's executor undertakes the transaction that gives rise
to the deductible outgoing. However, it is not authority that two
economically self-cancelling transactions should be treated as
extinguishing each other for tax purposes, as if for income tax purposes
neither transaction had occurred. Nor is it authority that a transaction
should be treated as deductible solely on the basis that it reverses the
economic effect of an earlier transaction in which taxable income was
derived.
The IRS' misinterpretation of Penn v. Robertson does not generally
matter for practical purposes (although it is incorrect in law) in cases where
the unwind transaction is also a true rescission. At least in most cases,
when a taxpayer derives taxable income under a contract, then rescinds the
contract, that rescission will inevitably give rise to an allowable deduction
in its own right. The outgoing (repayment) in the second transaction is
legally related to the first outgoing, so the repayment will necessarily relate
to the taxpayer's income-earning process, which is a touchstone of
deductibility. Ordinary principles of tax law operate to allow the deduction
to offset the taxable gain if the two transactions occur in the same tax year.
The result will be no net tax to pay on the rescinded contract, the same
outcome reached under the unwind doctrine that treats the two transactions
as having never occurred.
In contrast, the IRS' misunderstanding of Penn v. Robertson does
matter for practical purposes in cases where the unwind is not a true
rescission, but simply a situation where two parties voluntarily reach a
fresh agreement to reverse the effects of a completed and legally
independent transaction.20 These are cases where the unwind doctrine may
lead to an outcome that cannot be achieved under ordinary principles of tax
law (which is, as noted above, is the very attraction of unwinding for
taxpayers). In such cases, a taxpayer may derive taxable income under the
first transaction, but the reversal transaction where he repays that taxable
income will not necessarily result in a deduction under ordinary principles.
20. Rescissions are often voluntary, certainly they are often so for one party to the agreement
rescinded (such as the promisee in case of breach). In many cases even the promisor may unwind an
agreement "voluntarily" rather than run the risk that the promise will prevail in a dispute. The authors
thank David Hlasen for suggesting this point. See a/so infra Part IV.C below for a discussion of the
various uses of the term'rescission."~
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Under ordinary principles of tax law, the taxpayer faces the unhappy result
of paying net tax on the transactions. The unwind doctrine however allows
both transactions to be ignored for income tax purposes, leading to no
income tax consequences whatsoever.
One such case of a bare reversal and its tax consequences gained
media attention in 2009. This was the case of Mr. Douglas Poling, an
executive of American Insurance Group (AIG) (a beneficiary of the
Troubled Asset Relief Programme), who received a bonus from AIG, but
voluntarily repaid it in the same tax year. 2' Under ordinary principles of
tax law, the bonus was taxable income, and the repayment was a non-
deductible gift.22 Under ordinary principles, Mr. Poling would pay net
income tax on a repaid bonus, but under the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul.
80-58, he may treat both the bonus and repayment as having never occurred
for income tax purposes.
Part II of this article outlines Mr. Poling's case to illustrate why it is
important to discern the correct ratio of Penn v. Robertson. Part III is a
close reading of Penn v. Robertson. We find that Penn v. Robertson is not
authority for the unwind doctrine that the IRS, taxpayers, and
commentators routinely ascribe to it. Part IV explains how Rev. Rul. 80-58
and other IRS private letter rulings, as well as practitioner and academic
commentaries, have misunderstood Penn v. Robertson. Part V shows that
the case law has not in fact made the same mistakes in interpreting Penn v.
Robertson as the IRS Not only is Penn v. Robertson not good authority for
the unwind doctrine, but no other cases have authoritatively asserted that it
is. Part VI briefly considers whether taxpayers can nevertheless rely on the
unwind doctrine, despite there being no basis for it in case law. Part VII
briefly considers what should be done about the misunderstanding of Penn
v. Robertson.
II. THE ILLUSTRATIVE CASE OF MR. DOUGLAS POLING
The following elements of Mr. Douglas Poling's case are relevant to
this article's analysis of the precise meaning of Penn v. Robertson, and the
issue of whether Rev. Rul. 80-58 correctly reflects that meaning:
Mr. Poling is a taxpayer who receives a sum that, following ordinary
principles, is taxable income;
The taxpayer pays back that sum within the same tax year, reversing
the economic effect of the first transaction. However, the repayment is
not-we assume for sake of argument-deductible in its own right under
ordinary tax principles; and
21. The authors assume as such; see infra Part II.
22. Here, the authors do not use a technical tax meaning of "gift," but rather, the common law
meaning of a transfer of property with no or inadequate consideration.
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The taxpayer wishes to rely upon the special principle set out in Rev.
Rul. 80-58, so as to treat both transactions as if they had never occurred,
leading to no tax consequences.
A. BACKGROUND OF MR. POLING'S CASE
President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act into law on October 3, 2008. This Act authorized the
Troubled Assets Relief Programme, or "TARP," by which the United
States government endeavoured to stabilize the finance sector, and thus the
economy as a whole, which had been thrown into turmoil by the subprime
crisis. TARP involved the United States Treasury investing in financial
institutions by purchasing poor quality securities and other "troubled
assets" and by investing in shares of institutions that were illiquid.
TARP provoked controversy on many fronts. One such front was that
of the so-called "TARP bonuses." Typical of workers in the financial
sector, employees of many beneficiaries of TARP funds were accustomed
to receiving large proportions of their remuneration in the form of bonuses.
Perhaps rashly, TARP-assisted banks, insurance companies, and others
continued the practice in early 2009, in effect using taxpayers' funds
supplied by the Treasury via TARP.23 This action triggered a public
outcry.24
Notoriously, Douglas Poling received a bonus in 2009 of $6.4
million, 25 said to be the largest of all bonuses from TARP-assisted
companies that year.2 6 Mr. Poling was a senior executive at AIG, which
TARP had rescued from bankruptcy. Mr. Poling gained some fame among
tax practitioners and scholars, his case was widely reported, and protestors
picketed his home in Fairfield, Connecticut.27
Mr. Poling received attention for reasons other than the unmatched
sum of his bonus. As General Counsel and Chief Administrative Officer in
AIG's Financial Products Unit, Poling was a senior executive for a
particularly troubled part of the chronically troubled institution: His unit
had been responsible for the credit derivative trades that had "sank the
company."2 8 Mr. Poling "oversaw legal work on the contracts that sat at
23. Randall Smith & Liam Pleven, Some Will Pay Back AIG Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009,
at A I, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12374305551228070l.html.
24. Id.
25. Smith & Pleven, supra note 23.
26. id.
27. See Deborah Cassens Weiss, AIG Lawyer Offers to Return $6.4M Bonus, Stations Guards at
His Home, A.B.A. J. LAW NEWS Now (Mar 20, 2009), http://www ahajournal com/news/
article/aig_1awyer offers to return_6.4m bonus stationsguards at his home; James laranto, Give
Back That Bonus!, WALL Sr. J. (March 26 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBlI23807922595548325.html.
28. Deborah Solomon & Serena Ng, Fresh Pay Skirmish Erupts at AIG, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
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the core of the unit's business . . . [but] the terms of such contracts . . .
crippled AIG, required a massive $173.3 billion in government support and
imperilled the soundness of the world financial system."2 9 Nevertheless,
AIG scheduled $475 million in bonuses to be paid between March 2008
and March 2010 to the 400 employees of the Financial Products Unit."
The fact that Poling was a former Wall Street lawyer, a member of the New
York Bar, and graduate of Yale Law School also received media
attention.3 '
The public outcry about the TARP bonuses caused a number of
Democratic members of the United States House of Representatives to
sponsor bills to impose special taxes on the bonuses. 32 On March 19 the
House passed H.R. 1586 (The TARP Bonus Act of 2009), that stipulated a
90 per cent tax on TARP bonuses.33
While these bills were being proposed, people were thinking of
another possibility: recipients of TARP bonuses might simply repay them.
Apart from the public opprobrium of being a TARP bonus recipient,
repayment was an attractive option in the face of the effective tax rates that
the legislative bills would have produced.
The problem was that cities and states in the United States use the
federal income tax base for calculating their own income tax. Since a
TARP bonus was also income for city and state purposes, with a special
federal TARP bonus tax of (for example) 90 per cent in force, a resident of
Manhattan would suffer federal, state, and city tax of over 100 per cent on
a TARP bonus, and on top of that the Medicare levy.34 In the face of a
potential effective tax rate on TARP bonuses of over 100 per cent,
returning one's bonus had appeal.
Many recipients of bonuses from TARP-funded companies waived
their bonuses, repaid them, or announced that they intended to do so." An
2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl26015238193279485.html.
29. Randall Smith & Liam Pleven, Lawyer at Center of Troubled Unit Got Top Bonus, WALL ST.
J, Mar. 20, 2009, at A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123750761751290337.html.
30. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIGTARP-10-002, EXTENT OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' OVERSIGHT OF AIG COMPENSATION VARIED, AND
IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/
2009/Extent of FederalAgencies'_Oversight-ofAIGCompensationVaried andImportant
ChallengesRemain_10_14_09.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP].
31. Lawyer Gives Up $6.4M AIG Bonus, LAW SHUCKS (Mar. 23, 2009), http://lawshucks.com/
2009/03/lawyer-gives-up-64m-aig-bonus; see also Smith & Pleven, supra note 29.
32. See H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. (as introduced on March, 18 2009).
33. Id. (passed by a vote of 328-including 243 Democratic and 85 Republican yeas-to 93).
34. This article ignores the impact of the Alternative Minimum Tax. The article is more concerned
to isolate and determine income tax consequences of a reversal under general legal principles and the
special concept of an "unwind" than it is to determine the exact tax position of Poling or other similar
taxpayers.
35. Jack Lynch, Cuorno Says Most Huge AI.G. Bonuses Were Returned, NY.TIMES DEALBOOK
BLOG, (Mar. 23, 2009, 6:05 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/cuomo-says-many-
big-aig-bonuses-were-returned/.
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AIG spokesperson announced on March 19, 2009, that Mr. Poling intended
to repay his bonus "because [Poling] thought it was the correct thing to
do ," 36 but there has been no public confirmation that Poling in fact repaid
his bonus. This article assumes that Poling repaid his bonus in 2009, the
same year that he received it.37
In the end, no TARP Bonus Bill was enacted, seemingly because the
threat of the legislative bills had to some extent done their job without
becoming law. One week after H.R. 1586 was introduced to the House,
House majority leader Steny Hoyer said, "I think apparently the House bill
had its effect. They are giving it back," and gave his view that Congress
may not need to act at all if AIG employees continued to return the
payments.38
B. POLING'S ISSUE: PAYING TAX ON A RETURNED BONUS?
The question that may have vexed Mr. Poling's tax advisers when
they prepared Poling's tax return for 2009: what is the aggregate income
tax effect39 for someone in Mr. Poling's position of (a) receiving a bonus
and (b) (presumably) repaying it within the same tax year (for most TARP
bonus recipients, during 2009)?40 The question depends on Rev. Rul. 80-
58, and the correct meaning of the ruling's purported authority, Penn v.
Robertson.
C. POLING'S INCOME TAX POSITION
The analysis starts with ordinary tax law principles. Setting aside any
unwind doctrine, what are the tax consequences of the two transactions at
issue?
The transfer of the bonus from AIG to Poling, is taxable as
remuneration for Mr. Poling's services as an employee of AIG.4 1
36. Weiss, supra note 27.
37. SIGTARP, supra note 30, at 17.
38. Dierdre Walsh, Top House Dem says taxing bonuses may no longer be needed, CNN POLITICS
POLITICAL TICKER (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:50 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/03/24/top-
house-democrat-says-taxing-bonuses-may-no-longer-be-needed; Laura Litvan & Alison Vekshin,
Senate Reconsidering Employee-Bonus Tax Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2009 12:17 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sidzaWMCMJXvucIM&refer=home.
39. Again, gift tax implications are beyond the scope of this article, as are the corporate income tax
implications for AIG.
40. See Michael Doran, Comment to Tax Problems ofAIG Employees Who Repay Their Bonuses,
TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 27, 2009), http://taxproftypepad.com/taxprofblog/2009/03/tax-problems-of-
aig-.html#comments (suggesting that Penn v. Robertson may prevent executives who return their TARP
bonuses from facing a net tax impost): see also John W. Lee. Tax 7ARP Needed fbr Year One and Year
Two Returns of Executive Bonus to TARP Recipient: A Case Study of Year One Rescission/Exclusion
From Income and Year Two Deduction Under Section 1341, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 323, 330
(20 10).
41. The finance industry colloquially uses the word "bonus"~ in both its legally correct meaning (a
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The transfer from Mr. Poling to AIG-the bonus repayment-can be
best characterized as an entirely voluntary payment from Mr. Poling to
AIG, which, although economically connected to the bonus payment from
AIG to Mr. Poling, is, we assume, in ordinary contract law, unconnected to
the bonus payment. 4 2
The Internal Revenue Code allows in section 162(a) deductions for
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business." An employee is treated as being
in the business of earning income through the provision of services.43
Noland v. Commissioner44 suggests that under ordinary tax principles,
Poling cannot claim a deduction for a bonus repayment to AIG that is,
under ordinary law, a gift that was neither legally mandatory nor connected
in law to the original receipt of the bonus. Noland is authority for the
principle that when an employee voluntarily transfers value to his or her
employer these outlays are not generally deductible to the employee. 45 Lee,
gift for good work) and also in a meaning that is a contradiction in terms: extra remuneration for
meeting targets. It is unclear from media reports whether the "bonuses" received by AIG executives
were of the first or the second kind, and indeed it seems that AIG itself is unsure of the correct position:
see SIGTARP , supra note 30, at 17. The difference is immaterial for this article. We assume that the
bonus is received under an absolute right rather than a claim of right. By contrast, Lee, supra note 40,
at 340, argues for a claim of right approach, based on the fact that when the bonus payment was made
both parties had knowledge of circumstances that might necessitate a repayment. In our view this
reasoning is incorrect because the circumstances that "necessitated" repayment were business and social
circumstances (moral outrage and the threat of the TARP bonus bills that were not in the end enacted)
rather than any legal compulsion to repay the bonuses. We do not discuss this issue in detail here, but
assume that the bonus was received under an absolute legal right.
42. Reports portrayed Mr. Poling's pledge to repay his bonus as a completely voluntary response
to requests from AIG (and to public outrage). See Weiss, supra note 2727; SIGTARP, supra note 30, at
17. The conclusion that neither AIG's employment contracts nor any special contractual conditions
attached to the bonuses required that bonuses be repaid is consistent with a report that AIG was able to
extract from its employees pledges to repay only $45 million of the $168 million in bonuses that AIG
paid or was scheduled to pay in March 2008. As of October 2009, AIG has been able to collect only
$19 million of the $45 million pledged. SIGTARP, supra note 30, at 17.
43. Noland v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959).
44. Id.
45. Mr. Noland was an employee and stockholder of the Noland Company. He personally claimed
deductions for expenses that he had incurred for the Noland Company's benefit, including the cost of an
elaborate company Christmas party. The company did not reimburse Mr. Noland for the expenses. The
court found that Mr. Noland's contractual relationship with the Noland Company did not require him to
incur the expenses for which he had claimed deductions. The issue was whether Mr. Noland could
deduct the expenses under the I.R.C. §23(a) (1) (1939) (the predecessor to section 162). The court
disallowed the deductions claimed by Mr. Noland on the following basis:
The business of a corporation, however, is not that of its officers, employees or
stockholders. Though the individual stockholder-executive, in his own mind, may identify
his interest and business with those of the corporation, they legally are distinct, and,
ordinarily, if he voluntarily pays or guarantees the corporation's obligations, his expense
may not be deducted on his personal return.
Id. at 111. Furthermore, the court in Noland found "a corporate executive is normally expected to be
responsive to his social obligations and to discharge his civic and community responsibilities. . . . They
are, nonetheless, his obligations and responsibilities, and the expense their recognition imposes upon
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however argues, that:46
. while there is ample precedent that a repayment of a bonus [in the
same tax year] pursuant to an agreement entered into in 2009 after the
receipt of a bonus is "voluntary" i.e. not legally required and hence not
deductible, the better reasoned view is that if the 2009 repayment is an
ordinary and necessary expense of the employee's business in 2009, such
as protecting his or her business reputation, it should be deductible in
2009.
If Lee is correct, in some circumstances a bonus repayment in
situations of AIG executives like Mr. Poling may be deductible (even in
absence of the unwind doctrine).
We do not dwell on this question. This article is not primarily
concerned with whether the repayment is deductible under ordinary income
tax principles (an issue in itself addressed by Lee). We are instead
interested in the question of what is the correct income tax treatment of Mr.
Poling's repaid bonus, assuming that the repayment is not deductible.4 7
Therefore, for the purposes of this article we simply assume that the
repayment is not deductible under ordinary principles.
We also note, as Lee does, that even if the bonus were deductible
under ordinary income tax principles, such a deduction may be disallowed
under the Alternative Minimum Tax. 48  Alternatively, under the ordinary
income tax, the benefit of any deduction may be restricted by the limitation
on deductions for miscellaneous individual expenses and the phase-out of
itemized deductions, and personal exemptions for higher-income
him is personal, not business expense.' Noland, 269 F.2d at 112.
Although TARP bonus repayments might be described as being in fulfillment of a social obligation,
Noland suggests this is insufficient to make them deductible. Noland is also consistent with cases that
suggest that "generally, completely voluntary expenses are not necessary' expenses for the purposes of
deductibility under section 162. Voluntary expenses are not deductible even if the expenses are helpful
to the taxpayer's business." JACOB MERTENS, JR, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 25:18
(2010) (citing Tesar v.Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2709 (1997)).
46. Lee, supra note 40, at 340.
47. This question would have arisen even if the TARP Bonus Bills had become law. For example
H.R. 1586 addresses the possibility of repayment of bonuses in section 1(b)(2)(C):
Waiver or return of payments- Such term ["disqualified bonus payment"] shall not include
any amount if the employee irrevocably waives the employee's entitlement to such
payment, or the employee returns such payment to the employer, before the close of the
taxable year in which such payment is due. The preceding sentence shall not apply if the
employee receives any benefit from the employer in connection with the waiver or return
of such payment.
To impose an additional tax on bonuses received from certain TARP recipients, H.R. 1586, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
Thus, H.R. 1568 would have ensured that returned bonuses would escape the 90 per cent TARP bonus
levy imposed by H.R. 1568 However, it does not explicitly exclude a returned bonus from a taxpayers
adjusted gross income or taxable income. If H.R. 1568 had become law, a returned bonus would not
have been subject to the 90 per cent levy imposed by the bill, but the question would remain whether a
returned bonus is taxable income subject to usual federal, state, and local taxes.
48. Lee, supra note 40, at 340-341.
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taxpayers.49 Thus, even if the return of a bonus by a taxpayer like Mr.
Poling were deductible under ordinary income tax principles, the unwind
doctrine, if available, may allow the taxpayer to reach a tax result that is for
the taxpayer more favourable.
D. THE ISSUE THAT POLING'S SITUATION DRIVES US TO EXAMINE
It has been asserted" that the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-58
saves Poling from a net tax impost in respect of his returned bonus, even if
under ordinary tax principles the receipt of the bonus is taxable and its
return not deductible.
Because Poling's bonus payment and repayment economically
cancelled each other and occurred in the same year, Rev. Rul. 80-58
arguably has the effect that the two transactions can be treated, for tax
purposes, as if they had not occurred, resulting in no tax implications for
Poling. Indeed, this is what was speculated during the controversy
surrounding Mr. Poling."
As noted above, Rev. Rul. 80-58 cites Penn v. Robertson as authority
for its outcome. 52
The sections below explain what Penn v. Robertson does and does not
stand for, and show how Rev. Rul. 80-58 misinterprets Penn v. Robertson.
On a correct interpretation of the law, taxpayers like Mr. Poling would owe
tax on a bonus even if they had returned it. The bonus receipt would be
taxable, the repayment we assume is not deductible, and no special tax rule
would apply to allow the transactions to nullify each other for tax purposes.
III. PENN V ROBERTSON DOES NOT SUPPORT UNWINDING
This section is a close reading of Penn v. Robertson, and it finds no
support in that case for the unwind doctrine ascribed to it.
The theme of the following sections is that the holdings in Penn v.
Robertson were wholly concerned with matters of timing, not with matters
of substantive deductibility. (In later sections, we explain how the IRS and
commentators have erroneously misinterpreted Penn v. Robertson by
taking the case to relate not only to timing but also to substantive
deductibility.)
All parties, and the Court of Appeals, agreed, and proceeded on the
assumption that the outgoings that were at issue were deductible in their
own right as a matter of substance. The issue in the case related to timing:
49. Lee, supra note 40, at 340-341.
50. The authors again thank unnamed United States colleagues who suggested that reliance on
Revenue Rulings would lead to the result that Poling would pay no net tax.
51. Doran, supra note 40.
52. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
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in which tax year were those outgoings deductible? And, in respect of one
outgoing, incurred in 1931, was the outgoing deductible by Mr. Penn, the
taxpayer (who died during 1931), or by his executors?
A. FACTS AND HOLDINGS OF PENN V. ROBERTSON
Penn was a senior executive of the American Tobacco Company, a
corporation registered in New Jersey. In 1929, the company sold shares to
Penn at an under value as part of an employee share purchase scheme.
Penn paid for the shares by giving the company notes that acknowledged
his indebtedness for the price. In 1930, the company credited Penn with a
sum that reduced the amount outstanding on the notes. It did the same in
March 1931. Penn died on October 22, 1931. This article focuses mainly
on the credits that transferred value from the company to Penn and calls
them "the 1930 credit" and "the 1931 credit."
The American Tobacco Company had omitted to seek shareholder
approval for the employee share purchase scheme. As a result, the scheme
was forbidden by Chapter 175 New Jersey Laws 1920. Thus, the share
issue and the crediting of part of the price to Penn were void." Rogers, a
stockholder, challenged the scheme in the courts.54 The directors resolved
to reverse all transactions with employees who were willing to return to the
status quo ante. Penn was so willing, but died in October 1931 before
executing the reversal. After his death, his executors undertook the
necessary transactions.
Circuit Judge Parker and District Judge Chestnut held that both the
1930 credit and the 1931 credit were taxable to Penn in their respective
years of derivation as income received under a claim of right, following
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet," even though Penn's right to
the income was subject to challenge. As it happened, Penn escaped tax on
the 1930 credit because he failed to report the gain as income and a
limitation ran against the Commissioner.56
In respect of the 1931 credit, the American Tobacco Company's
reversal of the transaction, with the agreement of the executors, created a
deduction. The issue was whether the deduction inured to Penn (despite his
prior death) or to his executors. Parker and Chestnut held that for tax
purposes Penn's tax accounting period did not end with his death, but ran
the full calendar year in which his death occurred. Therefore, the reversal
in 1931, although undertaken by Penn's executors after Penn's death, was
nevertheless Penn's. This reasoning had the effect of cancelling the 1931
credit, both economically and for tax purposes.
53. Rev. Rul. 80 58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
54. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.. 288 U.S. 123. 124 (1933).
55. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Comm'r , 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
56. Penn v. Robertson, 1 15 F-.2d 167, 177 (4th Cir. 1940).
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B. RATIONALE FOR THE RESULT IN PENN V. ROBERTSON
There were two relevant transactions in 1931. The crediting
transaction was the American Tobacco Company's transfer of value to
Penn by crediting his account. The repayment transaction was the
executors' transfer of value back to the company, (which, as the court held,
counted for tax purposes as a transfer by Penn himself). The repayment
transaction, being a reversal of the whole share purchase scheme and of the
scheme's concomitant credits, involved much more value than the crediting
transaction, which constituted the 1931 credit alone; so the repayment
transaction more than set off the whole value of the crediting transaction,
both economically and for tax purposes. In short (and somewhat loosely),
the repayment transaction cancelled the crediting transaction, with the
result that Penn had no tax to pay on the 1931 credit. There are two
possible rationales for this result.
C. THE Two POSSIBLE RATIONALES
The deduction rationale is that since Penn owed the value of the
repayment to the American Tobacco Company (being value that had been
transferred to him pursuant to a void contract), and since that obligation
arose as a result of Penn's income-earning activities by way of service to
the American Tobacco Company, the value of the repayment was an
allowable deduction to Penn. Since the deduction was of greater value that
the 1931 credit it offset that credit for tax purposes and Penn had no taxable
income in respect of the credit. The deduction rationale is simply the
subtraction of an allowable deduction from a gain. It is an application of
ordinary tax law principles.
The conflation rationale is that, being self-cancelling, the crediting
transaction and the repayment transaction were conflated into a single
transaction, a transaction that was in effect a nullity and ignored for income
tax purposes. That is, for tax purposes both transactions became in law as
if they had never occurred, with neither assessable income derived nor a
deductible expense incurred."
The understanding that Penn v. Robertson stands for treating two
transactions as a nullity is the basis of the unwind doctrine. The IRS,
practitioners, and commentators have built a large structure upon that
understanding that the conflation rationale explains the result in Penn v.
Robertson.
57. One must emphasise the words "for tax purposes.' There is no suggestion that the conflation
concept means that the conflated transactions become a nullity for all purposes. No doubt, for instance,
if a transaction amounted to a criminal offence by one or both parties it would not usually make any
difference to guilt to reverse the transaction by a later one.
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In the authors' view, Penn v. Robertson does not support the weight of
this structure. As argued below, the decision in fact employed the
deduction rationale.
Both the deduction rationale and conflation rationale can apply only in
the circumstances of 1931, when the repayment transaction (the rescission)
occurred in the same year as the crediting transaction (the 1931 credit). By
virtue of the rule in Saunders v. Commissioner,5 8 the repayment could not
have had retrospective effect under the hypothesis of either rationale if the
repayment had been delayed until 1932. With regard to the deduction
rationale, had the rescission been delayed until 1932, Saunders v.
Commissioner would have prevented the allowable deduction in 1932 from
leaping over the barrier between the 1931 and 1932 tax years to be netted
against the credit assessable in 1931. Similarly, in regards to the conflation
rationale, the repayment could not bounce back into 1931 over the hurdle
of the end of the fiscal year to cancel the 1931 credit, had the repayment
been delayed until 1932.
D. ONLY ONE RATIONALE IS THE RATIO OF PENN V. ROBERTSON
Only one of the deduction and conflation rationales is the ratio of
Penn v. Robertson. The ratio of a case is the principle of law found in it
that has the force of law as regards the world of large. 9 The ratio of a case
is not just any rationale that can be used to explain the case's outcome.
Instead, as Goodhart's Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case
explained, the principle of a case is found by taking account of the facts
treated by the judge as material, and his or her decision as based on those
material facts.60
Thus, it is important to examine closely how the judges in Penn v.
Robertson both presented the material facts and reached their decision
based on those facts. While the outcome of Penn v. Robertson may be
consistent with the conflation rationale, the way that the judges presented
the facts and their decision show the deduction rationale to in fact be the
ratio of that case.
58. Saunders v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 101 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1939) as explained in Penn,
115 F.2d at 173.
59. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930)
(quoting Sir John Salmond, JURISPRUDENCE 201 (7th ed. 1924)).
60. Id. at 169. In some cases a court may pursue two parallel lines of argument, both of which are
independently sufficient to reach a result. Cross on Precedent states that "[w]hat happens in such a case
is that the judge says, in effect, 'Though I could reach my conclusion on either of two grounds, I base it
on both of them."' RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW. 87 (3rd ed. 19771 (quoting Comm'r
of Taxation for New South Wales v. Palmer (1907) A.C. 179, 184 (Austl.)). However, we argue below
that it is clear from the judgments in Penn v. Robertson that their H-onours did not pursue two parallel




E. JUDGES' EXPLANATION OF THE RATIONALE
Judges Parker and Chestnut did not explain as explicitly as they might
have done whether they adopted the deduction rationale or the conflation
rationale. In the part of the case relevant to this issue their main focus was
whether Penn, though dead, could take advantage of the executors'
outgoing in reversing the 1931 credit, or whether Penn's death on October
22, 1931 closed his tax year on that date.
As explained, the answer was that the deceased Penn could take
advantage of the expense in his tax return. However, their Honours did not
explicitly address whether this result came about by virtue of subtraction of
a deduction from a gain (the deduction rationale) or by virtue of conflation
and consequent extinction of transactions (the conflation rationale). They
framed the issue in these words: "whether the rescission in 1931
extinguished what otherwise would have been income to Penn in that
year."" To the judges, the point was "obvious," stating, "If the plan had
been terminated during Penn's lifetime in the same tax year that it
originated, it is obvious that there would have been no tax, as there was no
net profit." 62
Despite the lack of explicit clarity in the judgment, close reading
reveals four indicators that their Honours implicitly, but nevertheless
clearly, operated under the deduction rationale, the simple subtraction of a
deduction from a gain.
First, the Commissioner assumed that the case was about a
countervailing deduction, not about a conflation. As their Honours
understood it, counsel for the Commissioner submitted that, "the loss to
Penn by the rescission or re-sale could only serve as a deduction against
income received by his executors after his death during the calendar
year." 63
The court rejected this submission of the Commissioner by holding
that Penn himself, though dead, could take advantage of the loss that
emerged from the rescission. The judges did not explicitly address the
question of whether the loss was a deduction or a cancellation that had to
be conflated with the 1931 credit to make the credit a nullity. Their
Honours did however call the outgoing from the rescission, "a deduction" 64
and "such deduction." 65 This indicates that the court was operating under
the deduction rationale (the subtraction of an allowable deduction from a
derived gain) because, under the conflation and extinction rationale, a
deduction would not in fact arise, since the conflation rationale treats the
61. Penn, 115 F.2d at 173.
62. Id.
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two transactions together as a nullity.
Now, examine the issue in terms of Goodhart's analysis of ratio and
material facts. For Judges Parker and Chestnut, it was material that the
repayment was deductible. ("That the repayment was deductible" appears
on its face to be a conclusion of law, rather than the statement of a fact.
However, in the context of the tax question at issue in Penn v. Robertson
the deductibility of the repayment was a matter of fact on which the court
built its conclusion of law). Taking it that the repayment was deductible,
the court moved to the issue before it: could Penn's estate take advantage
of the deduction notwithstanding that he had died before the repayment was
made? That is, in terms of the court's process of reasoning, deductibility of
the repayment was a material fact. It follows that we cannot extract
authority from Penn v. Robertson that in the circumstances of the case, and
for tax purposes, the repayment was extinguished. Since extinguishment of
the second of a pair of transactions is crucial to the unwind doctrine, it
follows that Penn v. Robertson is not authority for that doctrine.
Secondly, had the question of conflation of transactions been at issue
as an alternative argument (alternative, that is, to the receipt/deduction
argument just addressed) the Commissioner would surely have submitted
that conflation could not span two tax periods marked off from one another
by Penn's death. After all, he certainly argued that a deduction could not
jump back to the period when Penn was alive (and therefore could not be
considered in Penn's tax position rather than the executor's).
Had the Commissioner submitted that a conflation could not span two
periods their Honours would have recorded their response in their
judgment, but they did not. The reason is clearly that counsel for Penn did
not argue that the case was one of conflation, but was satisfied to argue the
case as one of a deduction offsetting an earlier receipt.
The third reason for concluding that Penn v. Robertson did not involve
the conflation rationale is that this interpretation would require accepting
that the judges chose to make new law, even though they could have
reached the same result via the established and perfectly ordinary route of
subtracting a deduction from income.
There were two transactions relevant to this particular issue: the
crediting transaction, the 1931 credit to Penn in his lifetime, and the
repayment transaction, the outgoing that the executors incurred months
later. Both events were relevant for income tax purposes. To treat the
credit as a receipt and the repayment as a deduction requires no magic, no
new law. That is how income tax works: on net results. Indeed, the court
used the expression, "net profit."66
On the other hand, to conclude that the court adopted the conflation
rationale one has to assume that for some reason their Honours believed
66. Penn,I15 F.2d at 173.
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that it was necessary for the court to hold innovatively that some alchemy
had operated to conflate the two transactions and to leave them a fiscal
nullity as well as being an economic nullity. This conclusion also requires
one to believe that the court would have adopted this innovation without
explicitly noting that it had done so.
Fourthly, if the conflation rationale is correct it is an invention of tax
law that has no counterpart in the general law. Ordinarily, tax law is part of
and reflects the rest of the law. Where tax creates its own special rules the
courts point this out. For instance, Judges Parker and Chestnut took care to
explain that Penn was taxable on the 1930 credit to him, and why this was
so, even though the credit to him was void. They summarized the reason in
these terms:
But while we regard the [share purchase] plan as void.
[c]onstructively received income is taxable when the amount is definitely
liquidated and available to the taxpayer without restriction. The
circumstances under which the credits were made met these conditions.
The credits were precise in amount and were absolutely made as
reductions of the notes.
It would have been much more radical for their Honours to say that for
tax purposes a rescission makes a nondeductible expense deductible.
Considering how carefully they explained the constructive receipt rule that
tests derivation for tax purposes, which had by then been established law
for years, it is inconceivable that they would have laid down a completely
fresh rule without explaining their reasons.
And yet, as we explain in Part IV below, the IRS in Rev. Rul. 80-58,
1980-1 CB 181 seems to assume that their Honours invented a rule that had
the remarkable effect both of making a nondeductible expense deductible
and of causing deductible expenses to extinguish an earlier receipt,
transforming that earlier receipt into something that notionally had never
occurred for purposes of fiscal law. When unpacked in this manner, the
unstated assumption behind Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 CB 181 is seen to be
based on a misunderstanding.
F. HOW THE JUDGES MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUBSEQUENT
MISUNDERSTANDING
The misunderstanding appears to have occurred because of the manner
in which the Court of Appeals addressed the 1930 credit to Penn. As
explained, their Honours held that even though this credit was void, Penn
had to pay tax on it (or would have done so had he reported it as income).68
In respect of the 1930 credit, Penn could take no account of the outgoing
from the rescission that occurred in 1931. If that outgoing were no more
67. Penn, 115 F.2d at 174-175.
68. Id at 177.
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than a deduction resulting from an independent transaction (say a trading
loss in an independent business belonging to Penn) this answer would have
been obvious. Of course Penn could not set a 1931 outgoing against a 1930
receipt.
The answer was not so obvious with respect to the 1930 credit to
Penn, which Penn had a legal duty to repay, though no one recognised that
duty in 1930. In respect of the 1930 credit to Penn and of Penn's 1931
outgoing, the court's point was that Penn could not set the outgoing off
against the 1930 credit even though the outgoing had been latent in the
credit from the moment that Penn derived the credit.
In a lapse of logic, people led themselves to believe that if a credit and
an outgoing do occur in the same year, and if the outgoing was always
latent in the credit, what is happening is not a receipt set off by a deduction,
but two linked transactions that cancel one another and that by that
cancellation conflates to a nullity for fiscal purposes. Penn v. Robertson
contains no support for that proposition.
In short, the unwind doctrine has been fabricated: All subsequent
authority for the doctrine relies on Penn v. Robertson, but that case does
not provide support for the doctrine.
G. MISTAKEN USE OF THE TERM 'RESCISSION'
In most cases it does not matter which of the deduction rationale or the
conflation rationale is correct. The analytical frameworks of conflated
fiscal nullity and the receipt set off by a deduction of the same (or greater)
amount both produce a tax liability of zero in the year in question. In some
cases, however, the choice of rationale does matter. These are cases under
ordinary tax principles (in the absence of any unwind doctrine) where the
receipt in the crediting transaction counts for tax purposes, but where the
outgoing in the repayment transaction is not deductible in its own right:
Cases like the illustrative example of Mr. Poling set out above.
If the receipt is taxable, but the outgoing is not deductible, the
taxpayer's result will not be zero, but will instead be assessable income in
the amount of the credit. This result is unlikely in cases where the outgoing
is, from the start, latent in the credit. In that event, if the credit is
assessable, it would be odd for the taxpayer to be denied a deduction for the
outgoing. After all, on these assumed facts the origin of the outgoing is in
the taxpayer's attempt to earn the income that he or she derived as the
receipt. That is, the outgoing flows from the income-earning process,
usually a sure touchstone of deductibility. The facts of Penn v. Robertson
and the reversal of the real estate sale in Rev. Rul. 80-58, to be discussed
below at Part IV, are examples.
The result is different, however, where the outgoing comprising the
repayment transaction is not deductible in its own right: The position in Mr.
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Poling's case. The mistake arises from careless use of the term
"rescission." Where the repayment transaction is truly a rescission69 its
deductibility will almost automatically be a corollary of the assessability of
the credit. That is, where the repayment transaction is a true rescission, it
will exemplify the operation of a proposition that is wholly
unexceptionable: that when a deductible outgoing follows (or, indeed,
precedes) an assessable credit in the same tax year the taxpayer may net
one against the other. This rule is so fundamental and commonplace in a
system that assesses net, not gross, receipts that it has no name. For present
purposes, call it, "the netting rule." We observe the netting rule in
operation when the transactions in question are an unlawful payment and a
rescission, but the rule's operation does not depend on the existence of a
connection between the two. All that is required is that the receipt should
be assessable and the outgoing deductible.
Nevertheless, when focusing on the case of an assessable receipt and
an allowable deduction that happen to be legally connected because they
constitute together an unlawful payment and a rescission, as in the case of
Penn v. Robertson, it is a short step to say that transactions rescinded in the
same tax year are cancelled for tax purposes. This statement, however, is
correct only for true rescissions, being rescissions that undo payments that
are voidable or otherwise legally reversible.70 There is no authority to
apply the netting rule stated in the previous paragraph in cases where
"rescission" is used colloquially to mean "economic reversal."
Judges Chestnut and Parker inadvertently contributed to the
misunderstanding when they said, "But we agree with the district judge that
the rescission in 1931 before the close of the calendar year, extinguished
what otherwise would have been taxable income to Penn for that year."7
In context, it is clear that they did not mean that the rescission converted
what might have been a nondeductible outgoing into a deductible one, nor
did they mean that the recession converted a constructive derivation of
income into something that never happened. They assumed that the
outgoing was deductible, and, as has been explained, they labeled it as a
"deduction" one page later. 7 2  When they agreed that the rescission
extinguished taxable income they were making a point as to the timing of
the extinguishing. It happened in "that year." They were not saying that
the fact that the transaction was a rescission made the outgoing deductible;
it already was deductible.
Indeed, they were not entirely sure that the transaction was correctly
categorized as a rescission. They said, "The only possible doubt as to
69. As explained infra Part IV.
70. And even then, to repeat, only correct in the sense that the tax effects of the two transactions
cancel, not in the sense that for tax purposes, the two transactions themselves are extinguished.
71. Penn, 115 F.2d at 175.
72. Id. at i176, see text at supra note 63.
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whether it was properly called a rescission flows from the intrinsic
invalidity of the original transaction; in view of which, the so-called
rescission might possibly more properly be called an abandonment of an
invalid executory contract with a restoration."7 3 This passage indicates
that, whatever else their Honours intended, they did not see themselves as
making a statement of law about any and all transactions that people might
call "rescissions." They took it for granted (and reasonably so) that where
a contract is of a kind that results in taxable income, and that where that
contract is later rescinded due to some legal infirmity in the original
transaction, outgoings in respect of the rescission of that contract are
deductible.
IV. THE IRS' MISINTERPRETATION OF PENN V. ROBERTSON
IN REV. RUL. 80-58
To summarize the foregoing Part III, Penn v. Robertson was a case
that was solely about timing. The only issue about deductibility was as to
when the 1931 outgoing was deductible. In relation to the 1930 credit to
Penn was Penn's 1931 outgoing deductible? Certainly not. In relation to
the 1931 credit to Penn, could the executors post mortem, in a tax period
that started at Penn's death (or retrospectively, as it were, in Penn's final
tax return) claim the 1931 outgoing as deductible in a return that they filed
for Penn himself? The court found yes.
The IRS appears to have missed these points in Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-
1 CB 181, and instead, assumed that the issue in Penn v. Robertson related
to substantive deductibility. This is the first of two mistakes made by Rev.
Rul. 80-58: it mistakenly understands the judgment in Penn v. Robertson as
treating two transactions as a nullity when in fact, as explained above, the
court simply recognized and allowed a deduction to offset a taxable gain.
The result of this mistake is a doctrine of rescission that the case law cited
as authority does not support.
The ruling also makes a second important mistake. It appears to
extend the application of this fabricated unwind doctrine to transactions-
unlike those in Penn v. Robertson-where the reversal transaction is legally
unrelated to the original transaction.
The sum of these two mistakes means that Rev. Rul. 80-58 appears to
allow tax consequences, that have no basis in case law, for taxpayers in
situations akin to that of Mr. Poling.
73. Penn, 15 F.2d at 175.
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A. HYPOTHETICAL FACTS OF REv. RUL. 80-58
Rev. Rul. 80-58 gives an example, that it calls "Situation 1," of a sale
of land on revenue account in 1978 with the purchaser having a put option
to return the land to the seller and to have the price back, that is, to
"rescind" the contract of sale. The ruling states that if the rescission occurs
before the end of 1978 the profit on the sale is "extinguished." As
authority for this result, Rev. Rul. 80-58 cites Penn v. Robertson, in which,
according to the ruling, "the rescission in 1931 extinguished what
otherwise would have been taxable income for that year." 74
B. THE FIRST MISTAKE: MISUNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE IN PENN
V. ROBERTSON
In Situation 1, the sale of land during the 1978 tax year and the
rescission of that sale before the end of the tax year, Rev. Rul. 80-58 states
that the rescission "extinguished any taxable income for that year with
regard to that transaction."
By itself, this phrase could be read as supporting either the deduction
rationale (the subtraction of a deduction against a gain) or the conflation
rationale (treating the sale and rescission as if they had not occurred).
Perhaps, consistent with the deduction rationale, the ruling means that
the effects of the original sale are disregarded, because the tax effects of the
rescission cancel (or "extinguish") them.
Or, perhaps, consistent with the conflation rationale, "extinguished"
means that the transactions themselves for tax purposes are treated as null.
That is, the taxable income from the hypothetical sale of land no longer
exists, and the deduction from its reversal does not arise (as opposed to
simply being set off against each other).
Contextual clues in Rev. Rul. 80-58 suggest that the drafter in fact
(incorrectly) interpreted Penn v. Robertson as standing for the conflation
rationale. The phrase preceding the statement about "extinguishment"
indicates that Rev. Rul. 80-58 expresses the conflation rationale (emphasis
added): "in light of the Penn case, the original sale is to be disregarded for
federal income tax purposes because the rescission extinguished any
taxable income for that year with regard to that transaction." 75
The original sale of the land is the thing said to be "disregarded" for
tax purposes. By itself, this phrase is a clear statement of the conflation
rationale (the extinction of the rescinded transaction itself). This suggests
that the ambiguity present in the final clause of the quoted sentence should
be resolved in favour of the conflation rationale. 76
74. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
75. Id.
76. As noted infra Part IV.C, some subsequent commentary and rulings have focused exclusively
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The ruling concludes by explaining how the hypothetical taxpayer
should fill out the tax return for the 1978 tax year in each of the two
situations it set out (Situation 2 was one in which the rescission transaction
happened in 1979, after the close of the tax year in which the original sale
of land took place, with the ruling stating that "in light of the Penn case, the
rescission in 1979 is disregarded with respect to the taxable events
occurring in 1978"). The filing positions were to be: in Situation 1, no gain
on the sale will be recognized by A under section 101 of the Code; in
Situation 2, A must report the sale for 1978.
The ruling is unequivocal that in Situation 2 the original sale must be
reported in the 1978 tax return. However, there is no equivalent statement
for Situation 1; by implication, the taxpayer in Situation 1 does not report
the original sale on the 1978 tax return. This is indeed the implication that
commentators have taken from the ruling, i.e. Bailine explaining that:
"Federal income tax returns of A and B included nothing regarding the land
sale (or as it turned out, the nonsale)." 77
Such a filing position is consistent only with the conflation rationale,
where the original sale and the rescission transaction are both treated as
having not occurred, and therefore do not need to be reported in a tax
return. Under the deduction rationale, because both transactions would be
recognized as having independent tax effects, both the gain from the sale
and the outgoing from the rescission transaction would be reported (and
then netted against each other). In this light, the ruling's statement that
"[no] gain on the sale will be recognized" for Situation 1 is not a statement
regarding the net tax position (after netting the gain against the deduction
from the rescission transaction), but an absolute statement made in
reference to the sale transaction itself: It is ignored with the result that no
gain can come of it.
Finally, it would be strange for the IRS to issue a revenue ruling if its
intent was merely to proclaim the deduction rationale: The unoriginal
proposition that a taxable gain can be offset by a deductible outgoing in the
same tax year.
On the face of it, Rev. Rul. 80-58, therefore, seems to stand for the
conflation rationale. This is how subsequent private letter rulings have
interpreted Rev. Rul. 80-58. Many private letter rulings cite Rev. Rul. 80-
58 to reach results that can be explained only by the conflation rationale. In
these private letter rulings, the parties rely on Rev. Rul. 80-58 to avoid the
very tax results that would be produced if both of the relevant transactions
were given their independent tax effects (the deduction rationale) because
these are situations in which (unlike those in Rev. Rul. 80-58 and Penn v.
Robertson) those tax effects would not net to nothing, but would still leave
on the statement that the original stale is to be "disregarded," without reference to the second, more
ambiguous part of the sentence.
77. Bailine, supra note 5, at 33.
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some tax impact that the parties did not desire.78
For example, in both IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul 98-29-044 (Jul. 17, 1998) and
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005), Transaction I was the transfer of
stock in a company, Transaction 2 was the unwind of that transfer. Had
each transaction been given its independent tax effect, Transaction I would
have caused the company to lose its S Corporation status. Transaction 2
(the unwind) would not have regained the company its S corporation
status. 79
Relying on Rev. Rul. 80-58, the IRS held in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002
(Aug. 19, 2005) that "the legal doctrine of rescission applies to (1)
disregard the . . . issuance of . . . stock to the partnerships, and (2) to
prevent the termination of [the company's] S corporation status."
Similarly, in IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul 98-29-044 (Jul. 17, 1998) the IRS held,
citing Rev. Rul. 80-58, that the transactions themselves were "abrogated"
or "disregarded," preventing the termination of the company's S
corporation status. That is, in each case, Transaction 1-the event that
would have caused the company to terminate its S Corporation Status
was treated as if it had never occurred.80
In sum, Rev. Rul. 80-58 has been routinely understood to stand for the
conflation rationale, and to reach results that are possible only under that
rationale." Yet only one of the private letter rulings that relies on Rev.
78. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007) discussed at text accompanying infra note
101. Further, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005), an LLC taxed as a partnership
undertook a statutory conversion in order to be taxed as a corporation (the conversion was made in
anticipation of an initial public offering). Later in the year the taxpayer filed a certificate of conversion
to convert back into an LLC taxable as a partnership (done because the IPO was cancelled when market
conditions deteriorated). If both transactions had been given their independent tax effects, the entity
would have been treated as a company for part of the tax year, and the reconversion into a partnership
treated as a company liquidation. However the I.R.S. held:
Based [on] the parties' restoration, by December 31 . . . of the relative positions that they
would have occupied if the Incorporation Transaction had not occurred (Rev. Rul. 80-
58), we rule that, for federal income tax purposes: (1) the Taxpayer will be treated as a
partnership at all times during the calendar year...(2) Owner I and Owner 2 will be
treated as partners of the Taxpayer during such tax period; and (3) the conversion of the
Taxpayer from a corporation into a limited liability company taxable as partnership
pursuant to the Rescission Transaction will not be treated as a liquidation....
In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-23-010 (Jun. 5, 2009), Transaction 1 was distribution of stock, and
Transaction 2 was its reversal. Had both transactions been given their independent tax effect, the
companies involved in the transaction would have ceased to be members of the same wholly owned
group. Citing Rev. Rul. 80-58, the I.R.S. held that both transactions would be disregarded, and all of
the parties would be treated as being members of the same consolidated group throughout the tax year.
79. In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005), the problem was the five year waiting
period that must elapse following the termination of an S election before a new S election can be made.
80. Bailine, supra note 5, at 33 (discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005)).
81. In citing Rev. Rul. 80-58, the letter rulings also tend to emphasize the statement in Rev. Rul.
80-58 that a transaction that is rescinded later in the tax year can be "disregarded" (see, for example,
PLR 9141048). As discussed above, this part of Rev. Rul. 80-58 is relatively less ambiguous than the
phrase that speaks of "extinguishment" of income. The source of any ambiguity in Rev. Rul. 80-58 is
simply ignored.
139Winter 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Rul. 80-58 cites Penn v. Robertson directly,82 and none of the private letter
rulings sets out in detail what the IRS believes to be the rationale of Penn.
Instead, the rulings either assume that Penn v. Robertson stands for the
conflation rationale or cite Rev. Rul. 80-58 as justification for applying the
unwind doctrine, simply assuming it is correct in law.83 As argued above,
this assumption is mistaken.
Like the IRS private letter rulings, academic and practitioner
commentary also routinely states that Rev. Rul. 80-58 stands for the
conflation rationale, and assumes that this is a correct reflection of the
meaning of Penn v. Robertson.84 None of this commentary analyzes in
depth the purported ultimate authority of this "unwind doctrine," Penn v.
Robertson, to see whether it supports the doctrine. When Penn v.
Robertson is mentioned at all, the commentary assumes that the result in
the case was reached via the conflation rationale and does not consider the
possibility that a deduction offsetting taxable income could have explained
the case.85
In concluding (or assuming) that Penn v. Robertson stands for the
conflation rationale, Rev. Rul. 80-58, and the subsequent private letter
rulings and commentaries are mistaken. Rev. Rul. 80-58 uses the term
"extinguished" to mean "ignore both transactions." But the judges in Penn
v. Robertson were using "extinguished" to mean, "completely set off." The
outgoing on the rescission in Penn gave rise to a deduction that completely
set off the income. That outgoing was taken into consideration in the tax
year of the 1931 credit because the rescission happened before the taxable
period closed at the end of that year, in short, in the same tax year. Rev.
Rul. 80-58, subsequent IRS rulings, and commentaries reject this possible
interpretation of Penn v. Robertson by ignoring it entirely.
C. THE SECOND MISTAKE: BLURRING TRUE RESCISSIONS AND BARE
REVERSALS
The second mistake Rev. Rul. 80-58 makes is that it appears to adopt a
very broad definition of rescission, allowing the unwind treatment to apply
in cases not only of true rescissions (of which Penn v. Robertson is an
example) but also in cases of a bare reversal of a transaction.
82. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-04-039, (Jan 25, 1991).
83. Although incorrect, the assumption may not be inappropriate, considering the uncertainty as to
whether the ILR.S. is bound by its own incorrect public rulings. See infra Part VI.
84. E.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 880, stating that in Penn v Robertson, "[the] Fourth Circuit held
that amounts received in respect of the 1931 contributions were treated as though they were never
contributed in the first place," but with no analysis of the case in support of this conclusion. E.g.. Lee at
supra note 40, at 374, in his recent analysis of the case of executives repaying TARP bonuses seems to
assume that the interpretation of Penn v. Robertson in Rev. Rul. 80-58 is correct. See also Schnabel,
supra note 4, at 688 n.4.
85. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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The term "rescission" by itself is unhelpful when trying to understand
the class of transactions to which Rev. Rul. 80-58 and Penn v. Robertson
attach. This is because the term is employed in many different ways,
colloquially and legally; even two seminal contract treatises disagree about
its correct use.86
Fortunately, the IRS in Rev. Rul. 80-58 did not simply use the term
rescission without defining it. The ruling explained that it understood that
the principle in Penn v. Robertson applied to rescissions defined in this
fashion:8"
The legal concept of rescission refers to the abrogation, canceling, or
voiding of a contract that has the effect of releasing the contracting
parties from further obligations to each other and restoring the parties to
the relative positions that they would have occupied had no contract been
made. A rescission may be effected by mutual agreement of the parties,
by one of the parties declaring a rescission of the contract without the
consent of the other if sufficient grounds exist, or by applying to the
court for a decree of rescission.
Unfortunately, however, this definition of rescission appears to go
beyond the type of transaction involved in Penn v. Robertson. Penn v.
Robertson involved a transaction of the class that we will call a "true
rescission." Rev. Rul. 80-58 however defines rescissions in a way that
encompasses both "true rescissions" and another category of transaction
that we will call "bare reversals."
In this article, true rescissions are that category of unwinds" in which
the unwind transaction has some legal connection to the original
transaction that it undoes the economic effect of. True rescissions include
both judicially imposed rescissions and unwinds conducted to vindicate a
legal claim embedded in the original agreement between the parties.
Judicially imposed rescissions are "a cause of action through which a
contract was disaffirmed due to some infirmity in its formation, such as
86. RICHARD A. LORD,, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY SAMUEL WILLISTON § 68.3 51
(4th ed, 2002) is emphatic that rescission both in colloquial and legal contexts refers the outcome of an
agreement being abrogated or annulled, regardless of how that outcome is reached: "When and how
transactions may be rescinded is not part of the definition of the resulting rescission . . whether a
contract is spoken of as terminated, abrogated, annulled, avoided, discharged, or rescinded is not in
itself important." JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS BY ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN § 67.8
(Rev. ed. 1993) takes an equally emphatic contrary position that the general legal meaning of rescission
is a "mutual agreement by two contracting parties to terminate the legal relations created by their
previous contract." That is, the term rescission conveys some meaning about both the end result (an
abrogation or annulment of an agreement) and about the way that the outcome is reached (by mutual
agreement). Perillo at section 1105 finds any use of the term rescission to refer to the repudiation of a
contract upon vital breach as an "unfortunate," "secondary" meaning. Perillo prefers to restrict the use
of the term "rescind" to situations involving the mutual assent of both parties, and does so throughout
the treatise.
87. Rev. Rut. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
88. Where an "unwind" is any transaction that places the parties in the economic status quo ante
economically.
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fraud, mistake, or incapacity."89  In the case of judicially imposed
rescissions, the legal connection between the original transaction and its
subsequent unwind is some legal infirmity latent in the original transaction.
Penn v. Robertson involved an unwind of this type: the court in Penn v.
Robertson accepted the finding of the district court judge that the case was
one involving a rescission arising from infirmity in the original transaction,
namely that the original transaction was ultra vires.90
Another type of "true rescission" comprises unwinds where "parties
agree upfront that an agreement will be rescinded at some future time upon
the occurrence of a specified condition." 91 In these cases, "for one party to
exercise its contractual right to rescind, the rescinding party must strictly
follow the requirements of the original contract's rescission provision. "92
Again, there is a legal connection between the original transaction and the
unwind transaction, in this case because the unwind transaction is
conducted pursuant to a legal right embedded in the original agreement.
The hypothetical situation described in Rev. Rul. 80-58 is a rescission of
this type because the unwind of the land sale contract is pursuant to an
option embedded in the original sale and purchase agreement.
In the case of "true" rescissions, the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-
58 based on the IRS misinterpretation of Penn v. Robertson as standing for
the conflation rationale remains incorrect, but that mistake generally does
no practical mischief, because it leads to the same result as ordinary
principles of tax law. Where a taxpayer receives taxable income, then later
unwinds that receipt under a "true" rescission, the legal connection between
the unwind transaction, the outgoing in the second transaction is likely to
be deductible in its own right under sectionl162(a) as an ordinary or
necessary expense paid or incurred during the tax year in earning the
taxpayer's income. This is because if the original receipt is taxable because
it is part of the taxpayer's trade or business, and if the receipt is joined
causatively to the repayment, then it follows that the repayment is also part
of the taxpayer's trade or business, and therefore generally deductible.
89. See LORD, supra note 86, § 68.2. Note that Lord argues at section 68.3 that "rescission" in
cases where a party disaffirms a contract due to the material breach or repudiation of another is not in
fact a rescission: in these cases, the contract is not annulled or abrogated, it is simply that one party has
a valid and effective defense for nonperformance. It is not necessary for this article to reach a
conclusion as to whether such "rescissions" should be categorized as "true" rescissions or as "bare
reversals." Indeed, terminology is not in the end crucial, so long as legal categories are clearly defined.
For purposes of this article, the relevant categories are what we have defined as "true rescissions" and
"bare reversals.'
90. Counsel for Penn argued that the stock allotment plan had been void ab initio, and the Court
accepted that "the transaction was ultra vires of the directors and therefore void in the sense that it had
no legal force and effect . . . rather than merely voidable." Penn, I115 F.2d at 173. However, the Court
was willing to treat the reversal as a rescission. Id.




However, Rev. Rul. 80-58 appears to extend unwind treatment not
only to true rescissions, but also to transactions that simply reverse the
economic effect of an earlier transaction, but which are not legally
connected to the relevant earlier transaction. We call such transactions
simply "reversals."
An example of a bare reversal is what Schnabel labels "contractually
agreed rescissions,"" where the parties make a fresh agreement to reverse
the economic results of an earlier set of transactions. An agreement to
reverse an existing contract in this way is "subject to the same rules (and
flexibility) as applies to contract formation in general"9 4:
Contractual rescission is simply a second contract by which parties
change the obligation entered into by the first contract. Although parties
were traditionally required to restore each party to status quo ante even
when voluntarily rescinding a contract, newer contracts principles do not
require this. Accordingly, parties today can agree to rescind for any
reason and are essentially afforded the same freedom of contract to
rescind an agreement as they have to enter into an agreement.
An example is a contract for sale of goods where both delivery and
payment are complete. Certainly, buyer and retailer may agree to reverse
the effect of the contract, as where a buyer who has changed her mind
returns goods to a shop for a refund, without any right to do so, but relying
on the shop's goodwill. In these circumstances, where the shop has no
obligation to allow such return and refund, the transactions constitute a new
contract, in effect a re-sale from customer to shop. Economically, the
parties return to the status quo ante, but there is nothing latent in the
original, executed contract that leads to this result. The original contract
has been completed leaving no residual obligation upon either party or
legal right upon which they can rely to require the reversal.
Another example of a bare reversal is Mr. Poling's situation of
voluntarily returning a bonus. As discussed above at Part II, we assume
that Poling's voluntary repayment is not connected in law to the original
receipt of his bonus, but is legally a fresh, unconnected gift transaction.
Penn v. Robertson, however, was certainly not a case of a bare
reversal. It can therefore provide no authority for applying unwind
treatment to bare reversals (setting aside the more fundamental objection
that it provides no authority for unwind treatment at all). Indeed the judges
in Penn v. Robertson were very explicit in pointing out that the facts in that
case did not constitute a re-sale, but were in fact a true rescission. 5
The IRS in Penn had indeed asserted that the case was one of a re-
sale. Penn, before his death, "appreciated the possible or probably
infirmity of his right to the stock and was willing to surrender it," and his
93. Schnabel, supra note 4, at 699.
94. Id.
95. Penn, 115 F.2d at 175, 176.
Winter 2011 143
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
executors had "agreed to the rescission." But this assent to the rescission
did not mean that Penn (via his executors) was entering into a fresh,
"mutual agreement" with American Tobacco Company to sell back to the
company any benefits that had been received under the share plan. The
executors were merely agreeing to recognize that they had no legal right to
the share plan in the first place. Indeed, a re-sale would not be possible
because of the infirmity in the original share agreement. Penn could not
sell rights to benefits that he had not validly received without infirmity.
The judges explicitly rejected the IRS' contention that Penn had agreed to a
re-sale, stating that, "[w]e have no doubt that the parties intended a genuine
rescission. Certainly what was done was entirely consistent therewith ...
in no sense could it properly be termed a re-sale."96
Although Penn v. Robertson was not a case of a re-sale, Rev. Rul. 80-
58 appears to apply to re-sales and other bare reversals. This is not because
the hypothetical example in Rev. Rul. 80-58 is a bare reversal; it was in
fact as noted above a case of a true rescission, in which a land sale was
reversed subject to an option in the original sale contract. However, the
ruling stated that that "rescission may be effected by mutual agreement."
Practitioners and the IRS have taken that statement to mean that the unwind
doctrine fabricated in Rev. Rul. 80-58 applies to bare reversals in which the
parties agree to reverse the economic effects of fully executed contracts and
other completed transactions.
When applying Rev. Rul. 80-58 in private letter rulings, the IRS has
played down the "rescission" requirement ina way that makes it clear that
the Service regards the "restoration" of economic positions as the key to
Rev. Rul. 80-58, irrespective of whether that restoration came about
because of what the authors call a bare reversal, or because of what the
authors call a true rescission. For example, IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-29-044
(July 17, 1998) stated a formulation of the requirements of Rev. Rul. 80-58
that has been repeated in a number of subsequent letter rulings (emphasis
added):
According to [Rev. Rul. 80-58], there are at least two conditions that
must be satisfied for the remedy of rescission to apply to disregard a
transaction for federal income tax purposes. First the parties to the
transaction must return to the status quo ante; that is, they must be
restored to "the relative positions they would have occupied had no
contract been made. Second, this restoration must be achieved within
the taxable year of the transaction.
This formulation requires only that the parties be "restored" to the
same positions that they would have otherwise occupied had no contract
been made. No mention is made of any requirements as to how restoration
must come about. It does not specify that the restoration must come about
via a "rescission," and leaves open the possibility that the restoration may
96. Penn, I115 F.2d at 176.
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be achieved by a bare reversal.
The formulation avers that there are "at least" two conditions required
by Rev. Rul. 80-58, leaving open the possibility that there are others
(perhaps including that the restoration must come about via a "rescission"
for the ruling to apply). None of the private letter rulings that use the
formulation mention any further requirements for the form of the
restoration."
In addition to downplaying the "rescission" requirement of Rev. Rul.
80-58, the Service has in fact applied the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-
58 in many cases where the so-called rescission is a bare reversal. This
observation is undoubtedly what led Schnabel to advise:98
. . . if the parties to a transaction collectively agree to rescind the
transaction, the transaction can be disregarded for federal tax purposes
under the rescission doctrine even if the decisions to rescind was
triggered by a change in circumstances rather than by some sort of
infirmity in the original transaction . . . the rescission in Private Letter
Ruling 2006-13-027 was triggered by a "precipitous and unexpected
deterioration in market conditions."
[. -. 1
Taxpayers wishing to disregard a transaction under the rescission
doctrine would clearly be well advised to use one of three approaches.
First, the taxpayer and the other parties to the original agreement can
enter into a new agreement that has the word "rescission" in the title and
that provides for the rescission of the original agreement and the
transactions undertaken pursuant to the original agreement.... The first
approach is obviously the more important, as pre-negotiated rescission
rights are very uncommon as a commercial matter. . . In virtually all
published and private rulings where the Service held the rescission
doctrine to be available, the unwinding of the original transaction was
effected to some sort of rescission agreement (or a right included in the
original agreement)
That is, Rev. Rul. 80-58 extends unwind treatment to bare reversals,
so long as the parties are careful enough to use the word "rescission" when
describing the reversal transaction. It matters not that the reversal is not a
true rescission, having no legal connection to the original transaction.
One example of a letter ruling that applies the unwind doctrine to a
bare reversal is IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-040-39 (Jan. 25, 1991). In that
ruling, a company transferred shares to employees along with cash bonuses
sufficient to pay the employees' taxes on those shares. The company
subsequently discovered that true value of the transferred shares was much
higher than its accountant had estimated. Had the transfer stood, it would
have resulted in an unwanted change to company earnings 655 per cent
higher than originally estimated. The company, "with full agreement" of
97. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005); see also 07-52-035 (Dec. 27, 2007);
see also 08-43-001 (Oct. 24, 2008); see also 09-23-0 10 (June 5, 2009).
98. Schnabel, supra note 4, at 699-702.
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the affected employees, wished to "rescind the agreements with the
employees and require them to transfer the shares back to the company. In
addition, Company does not intend to pay the cash bonus originally agreed
upon." The Service cited Rev. Rul. 80-58 in holding that the employees
would not recognize any federal income in relation to the transactions.
Unlike in Penn v. Robertson, there was no contention that the transfer
of shares and cash bonuses was ultra vires. There was no alleged legal
infirmity in the original transaction. The reason for unwinding was that it
was simply a poor financial decision viewed in hindsight with knowledge
of the more accurate valuation of the shares transferred. There was no
suggestion that the original transfer involved any reservation allowing the
employees or company to require the return of the shares and cash. Thus,
although the Service referred to the unwind transaction as a "rescission" in
the letter ruling, under the terminology set out in Part III above the unwind
transaction was a bare reversal. 99
Another example of the IRS applying the unwind doctrine to a bare
reversal is IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-010-19 (Jan. 5, 2007). In this ruling, the
parties did not even attempt to label the unwind as a rescission. The ruling
involved a parent company merging a subsidiary into its business, thereby
liquidating it. The parent then experienced "unexpected and significant
weakness"' 0 in its business, and its managers realized that liquidating the
subsidiary, thereby forfeiting the subsidiary's tax basis, had been
imprudent. The parties tried to reverse the transactions by incorporating a
new subsidiary, with the same assets, liabilities, articles of incorporation,
and bylaws of the old subsidiary.
The taxpayer made no representation that anything other than a
change of circumstances and the benefit of hindsight motivated the
attempted unwind. No legal infirmities in the original transactions were
suggested; the parties simply regretted the tax consequences of the original
transaction. As Schnabel noted the parties in this case did not style the
fresh reversal transaction as a rescission.1ot
Citing Rev. Rul. 80-58, the IRS allowed unwind treatment, with the
new subsidiary being treated for tax purposes as if it was the old subsidiary.
The ruling focused on the fact that the parties had been restored before the
end of the tax year to the same position that they would have occupied had
the merger transaction not occurred. No mention of rescission is made in
99. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-23-010 (June 5, 2009) (in which the 1.R.S. allowed the parties
to ignore the distribution and redemption of stock and its attempted reversal. The parties did not
suggest any legal infirmity in the original redemption and distribution, but were instead very explicit
that the unwind was a voluntary reversal motivated by a change in the management of all of the
companies involved. The new management thought the merger was for business reasons unsound in the
new business environment.).
100. 1.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-010 19 (Jan. 5, 2007).
101. Schnabel, supra note 4, at 700. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-15-031 (Apr. 10, 2009) (a
similar situation involving the amalgamation of two companies).
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the ruling at all, perhaps because it would have been a stretch to call a fresh
incorporation a rescission of a liquidation, even colloquially.102 A true
rescission occurs between parties to an original agreement or transaction,
but statutory incorporations, liquidations, or other entity status changes
blessed by statute or a regulatory body cannot be regarded as "rescinded"
as between two parties in a legal sense.
In summary, Revenue Ruling 80-58 can be, and has been interpreted
as applying the rescission doctrine (derived from a misunderstanding of the
ratio in Penn v. Robertson) to cases of true rescissions, and also to cases of
bare reversals. This is despite the fact that in Penn v. Robertson itself, the
judges were careful to point out that the case was not one of a re-sale (i.e., a
bare reversal), but a "genuine rescission." 0 3
As noted earlier, adopting the "rescission doctrine" in cases of true
reversals applies an incorrect interpretation of Penn v. Robertson, but does
no practical mischief in that the same results can be reached under ordinary
principles of tax law. However, in the case of bare reversals, applying the
"rescission doctrine" leads to novel results that are impossible under
ordinary tax principles or the correct interpretation and application of Penn
v. Robertson. This is surely the attraction that Rev. Rul. 80-58 holds for
many taxpayers who rely on it, including many who obtained private letter
rulings such as those mentioned above.
D. HOW THE MISTAKES IN REV. RUL. 80-58 COMBINE TO SAVE POLING
Taxpayers like Mr. Poling can take advantage of the two mistakes in
Rev. Rul. 80-58 to save themselves from tax consequences that are for
them undesirable.
Mr. Poling's situation is, we assume, that of a bare reversal, and the
cumulative effect of the mistakes in Rev. Rul. 80-58 has been for the IRS
to allow unwind treatment in cases of a bare reversal.
So, although Poling's return of his bonus to AIG is (we assume) a gift
that is not deductible in its own right, because it puts Poling in the
economic status quo ante within the tax year, under Rev. Rul. 80-58, Poling
can be treated for income tax purposes as having never received a bonus
and never returned it because it puts Poling in the economic status quo ante
in the same tax year. Rulings indicate that this treatment is available even
though the original bonus receipt was not ultra vires, and had been
completed.' 04 Rulings as also indicate that that it should not matter that
Poling was motivated to return the bonus by potential undesirable tax
102. Although in some letter rulings, the I.R.S. has "somewhat awkwardly" painted a statutory
conversion of an LLC into a corporation pursuant to state law as being effected pursuant to contract,
Schnabel, supra note 4, at 701; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 06-13-027 (Mar. 31, 2006).
103. Penn, 115 F.2d I167 at 175.
104. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9 1-04-039 (Jan. 25, 1991).
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consequences from the spectre of the TARP bonus bills.'
If the IRS continues to follow and apply Rev. Rul. 80-58 as it has,
both Poling's receipt of the bonus and his return of it to AIG would be
treated for tax purposes as if they had not occurred. He would not have to
acknowledge either transaction on his income tax returns. This is a far
more attractive result for Poling than that reached under ordinary tax
principles, which would require him to pay tax on a bonus that he does not
keep.
Of course, as we have shown, this is not the outcome sanctioned by
Penn v. Robertson. When the second transfer is not deductible in its own
right there is no principle in Penn v. Robertson that can cause the second
transfer to offset tax on the derivation of the first transfer. If the second
transfer is deductible such a set-off can occur, but this happens according to
ordinary principles of deductibility (so long as the second gift happens
before the end of the tax year), without needing help from Penn v.
Robertson.
V. THE CASE LAW DOES NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES AS
REV. RUL. 80-58 IN INTERPRETING PENN V ROBERTSON
In Parts III and IV we have found that Revenue Ruling 80-58
misinterpreted Penn v. Robertson and that this mistake allows taxpayers to
achieve tax results that are not sanctioned by that case. We now show, for
completeness, that this misinterpretation is a mistake that has been made
only by the IRS, practitioners, and commentators, but not to date by judges.
We survey the cases since Penn v. Robertson, and find that there is no
compelling judicial authority that misinterprets Penn v. Robertson. The
relevant case law falls into four groups.
The first group of cases-Fender,'0 6 Gargaro,'0 7 and Lewis'o-reach
results that are superficially similar to the result that would be reached
under the unwind doctrine. However, examination of these cases reveals
that they were decided on the basis of different legal principles.
The second group-Trico0 9 and Scalleno-are cases that mention
Penn v. Robertson in dicta, and at best provide weak dicta support for
unwinding.
The third group consists of one case, Hutcheson,"' a case that again
provides at best weak dicta support for unwinding, but does not mention
105. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007).
106. Fender Sales, Inc. v. Comm'r, 22 T.C.M. (CCII) 550 (1963).
107 G-argaro v IJnited States, 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl 1947)
108. Lewis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1950), rev d/, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
109. In re Trico Marine Services, Inc., 343 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
1 10. Scallen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (C(CH) 177 (1987).
Ill. Hutcheson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. ((C(H) 2425 (1996).
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Penn v. Robertson and instead discusses only Rev. Rul. 80-58.
The fourth group of cases-Crellin 's Estate"2 and Branum v.
Campbell" -indicate that the interpretation of Penn v. Robertson in Part
III above is correct: in these two cases the court rejected a taxpayer's
request to apply unwind treatment to a bare reversal. These cases do not,
however, mention Penn v. Robertson.
A. CASES SUPERFICIALLY CONSISTENT WITH UNWIND TREATMENT BUT
NOT COMPELLING AUTHORITY FOR UNWINDING
Fender, and Gargaro and Lewis, all reach results that are superficially
consistent with the unwind doctrine. But, just because the results of these
case could be explained by the unwind doctrine, it does not follow that they
are authority for that approach. As with Penn v. Robertson itself, the ratios
of Fender, Gargaro, and Lewis must be determined taking account of the
facts treated by the judges in these cases as material, and the judges'
decisions as based on those material facts.114 In that light, Fender,
Gargaro, and Lewis were not in fact decided on the basis of the unwind
rationale and therefore are not authority for that approach.
1. Fender v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue
Although the result in Fender seems superficially consistent with the
mistaken interpretation of Penn v. Robertson in Rev. Rul. 80-58, it is not in
fact compelling authority for that mistaken interpretation. The court in
Fender cites, but does not rely on, Penn v. Robertson. Furthermore, rather
than being a clear case where the court gave a bare reversal unwind
treatment, the court appeared to instead create a special rule concerning
when a reversal transaction will be considered deductible in its own right:
namely in circumstances where both transactions involve a company and a
principle shareholder in that company who is also an employee.
The taxpayer in Fender was C. Leo Fender, the founder of Fender
Electric Instrument Co., Inc. ("Instrument"), and designer of such famous
electric guitars as the Fender Stratocaster. Fender was the sole shareholder
in Instrument, and its president, treasurer, and chairman of the board of
directors.
Fender received a basic salary for his services to Instrument, and an
annual bonus of five per cent of Instrument's annual sales, payable to
Fender after the close of the calendar year. In the 1956 tax year, Fender
derived a bonus of $30,358. In the 1957 tax year, Fender derived a bonus
of $37,205 in 1957. However, before the end of the 1956 and 1957 tax
112. Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953).
113. Branum v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
114. Goodhart, supra note 59.
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years, Fender returned to Instrument $22,000 and $25,000 of each bonus,
because Fender was aware of the "precarious cash position of Instrument."
The Tax Court was asked to consider:1 15
Whether the full amounts of $30,357.84 and $37,205.04 received by C.
Leo Fender as salary bonuses from Fender Electric Instrument Co. In the
years 1956 and 1957, respectively, constitute taxable income,
notwithstanding C. Leo Fender's subsequent return of $22,000 in 1956
and $25,000 in 1957 to Fender Electric Instrument Co.
The Tax Court held that the returned amounts should not have been
entered as income in Fender's 1956 and 1957 tax returns.' 16
This result is superficially consistent with the application of the
unwind doctrine to a voluntary, bare reversal of a completed transaction.
However, the court did not in fact decide the case on that basis.
The court instead held that the return of the bonus was not, as the
Commissioner argued, an outright gift, or a partial repayment of debt that
Fender owed to Instrument, or a loan to Instrument or a contribution of
Instrument's capital. Fender, the court found, had intended to reduce his
compensation by returning the bonuses, and it was to be treated as "an
adjustment of the contract or obligation and a repayment of a portion of the
amount received." 1 7 In reaching this result, the court quoted with approval
the following passage from HC Couch-"
Salary arrangement between corporations and their principal
shareholders and managers in cases like this one, where the manager is
expected by his associates to protect the interests and the future
prospects of the company even at sacrifice to himself, are and must be at
times subject to modification as may be made by agreement from time to
time.
That is, while in most cases a voluntary return of a bonus might be
treated as a fresh transaction unconnected to the original contract between
the employee and his employer, a special rule applies when the employee is
also a principal shareholder, such that the return of the bonus is not treated
as a fresh transaction, but as an adjustment of the original contractual
relationship between the employee-shareholder and the company. The rule
has the effect of creating a legal connection between the original contract
and the return of the bonus. In the terminology adopted in Part III above,
in these special circumstances, the return of a bonus is a true rescission,
legally connected to the original salary arrangement, not a fresh agreement
about compensation (a bare reversal). As a consequence, the return of the
bonus by a shareholder employee in these circumstances would be
deductible in its own right, connected as it is to the original agreement
under which the shareholder/employee derives his income. No special






unwind doctrine is needed. Fender is therefore not good authority for the
effect of Rev. Rul. 80-58 that bare reversals can be given "unwind"
treatment. It is restricted to its narrow facts involving employees who are
also principal shareholders.
The court in Fender mentioned Penn v. Robertson only to say: "other
courts have adhered to a similar position;""' there is no further analysis of
Penn v. Robertson. There is no indication that the court relied on Penn v.
Robertson, and indeed the court's discussion of HC Couch shows that the
court was instead relying on a special principle about when company
transactions with shareholder-employees will be treated as adjustments to
existing contracts rather than a fresh transaction.
2. Gargaro v. United States, Lewis v. United States, and Haberkorn v.
United States
Gargaro, Lewis, and Haberkornl20 are three cases that each mentions
Penn v. Robertson. In each case the taxpayer was an employee who had
received a bonus. In each case the taxpayer treated the entire bonus as
taxable income in his tax return in the year in which the bonus was
received. In each case, the taxpayer discovered after the close of that tax
year that he was in fact entitled to a smaller bonus than he had received,
and repaid the overpayment to his employer.12 1
The Claims Court in both Gargaro and Lewis allowed the taxpayer to
reopen his tax return for the tax year in which he received the bonus, and to
reduce the amount of bonus income he had received in that year. 122  By
contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Haberkorn held that the correct tax treatment would be for the taxpayer to
claim a deduction for the amount of the bonus he was required to repay in
the years in which such repayments were made.123  The Supreme Court
heard Lewis because of this circuit split, and overturned the decision of the
119. Fender Sales,Inc., 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 550.
120. Haberkorn v. United States, 78 F.Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
121. In Gargaro, the bonus was calculated and paid to the taxpayer in 1942 as a per centage of
profits as the company understood those profits to be in 1942. In 1945, the Gargaro Company's 1942
profits were reduced under renegotiation proceedings with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Price Adjustment Board (the company had entered contracts with governmental agencies that were
subject to such proceedings). In Lewis, the bonus overpayment was due to the taxpayer's error. The
taxpayer was entitled to a bonus calculated as a per centage of the Accurate Spring Manufacturing Co.'s
profits, but the taxpayer had erroneously ordered his bonus in 1944 to be calculated and paid as a per
centage of gross profits. The company discovered this error after the close of the tax year and in 1946
obtained a judgment against the taxpayer for the return of the bonus. In Haberkorn, the taxpayer was
paid a bonus of a percentage of the company's net income in 1942, but in 1944 the company discovered
that the accounts for 1942 contained an error and that the company's profits had been overstated in that
year.
122. 73 F. Supp. at 975; 340 U.S. at 592.
123. Haberkorn, 78 F.Supp. at 195.
Winter 2011 151
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Claims Court.'2 4
Even aside from Lewis being overturned in the Supreme Court,'2 5
while the Gargaro and Lewis decisions did allow a taxpayer to ignore an
original transaction (receipt of overpayment) by virtue of a later reversal
transaction (repayment of overpayment), the cases do not support
interpreting Penn v. Robertson to give rise to the "unwind doctrine"
attributed it in Rev. Rul. 80-58, for the following reasons.
First, the majority in Gargaro and Lewis neither relied on Penn v.
Robertson nor even mentioned Penn. Whittaker J, the dissenting judge in
both Gargaro and Lewis noted this omission, and cited Penn v. Robertson
in his dissenting judgment that the taxpayers in those cases should not be
entitled to reduce the amount of bonus income originally received based on
subsequent events in a future tax year: 126
If I had to decide this case according to what I think the law ought to be,
I might decide it as the majority has done; but our job, of course, is to
decide the case according to the law as it is, and I do not think the
majority has done this.
It does seem unjust that plaintiff should have to pay a tax on income he
was not allowed to keep, but I think the law says he should. He took his
bonus from the company believing he was entitled to it, and with the
right to do so with it what he pleased. It was his absolutely and
unconditionally, so far as any one knew until long after the taxable year
had passed. Under all authorities this constituted income to him . see,
among others, . . . Penn v. Robertson. . . . This is the law today.
The unanimous court in Haberkorn also cited Penn v. Robertson in
finding that the taxpayer in that case could not adjust his income
recognized in the year that he received the bonus overpayment, but could
claim a deduction in the year that he repaid the excess amount. 127 Perhaps
if the majority in Gargaro and Lewis had considered Penn, it would have
found, as the dissent urged (and as the Sixth Circuit found in Haberkorn),
that the close of the taxpayer's income year prevented his income in the
year he received the bonus from being retroactively reduced due to later
124. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951). The Court stated certiorari was granted
because of the conflict between the finding of the Court of Claims in Lewis and the findings of the Sixth
Circuit in Haberkorn. The courts in both Haberkorn and Lewis had acknowledged the split. The
Supreme Court in a brief opinion which did not mention Penn v. Robertson stated that Lewis had taken
a view in conflict with the well-settled claim of right doctrine. The Supreme Court noted that it had
been suggested that the result in Lewis was a more "equitable approach" but that there was "'no reason
to depart from a well-settled law "merely because it results in an advantage or disadvantage to a
taxpayer.' Id. at 592.
125. However, the dissent preferred the approach of the Claims Court because under that approach,
"the government would not be permitted to maintain the unconscionable position that it can keep the tax
after it is shown that payment was made on money which was not income to the taxpayer. Id. at 523-
524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Gargaro, 73 F. Supp. at 975-976.
127. Haberkorn, 78 F.Supp. at 193.
152 Vol. 7:1
UNWIND DOCTRINE
events.128 In any event, because the majority in Gargaro and Lewis did not
explicitly consider Penn v. Robertson, the cases cannot be clear judicial
interpretations of Penn v. Robertson as creating an "unwind doctrine."
The second reason why Gargaro and Lewis do not support the
interpretation of Penn v. Robertson taken in Rev. Rul. 80-58 is that the
majority in those cases reached their decision based on considerations of
general justice wholly absent from both Penn v. Robertson and Rev. Rul.
80-58. In Gargaro, the majority stated:' 29
We . . . are similarly impressed here, with the injustice of the
Government's position. For the Government to insist upon keeping
taxes paid to it by a taxpayer under the mistaken belief that he had
received income for his own use and benefit, when in fact he received it
only by reason of an honest mistake, and was obliged to and did give it
back and got no benefit from it, there is nothing to be said morally.
The majority seemed to find the contrast with Wilcox,130 in which an
embezzler was found not taxable on embezzled money, as particularly
egregious:
We are asked to hold that an honest man who received money under a
mistake and immediately restored it when the mistake was discovered,
must pay an income tax upon it, whereas than embezzler who received
money and used it (we suppose it is immaterial that he lost it gambling)
and did not restore it to the rightful owner, owes the Government no tax.
We would suppose that if there was to be a difference in the treatment of
these two situations, the difference should be that the honest taxpayer
would be treated more considerately than the embezzler.
That is, the court in Gargaro and Lewis treated as material that it
would be unjust or immoral for the Government to refuse to reopen and
retrospectively amend the taxpayer's return given the circumstances. This
explicit appeal to morality is entirely absent in both Rev. Rul. 80-58 and
Penn v. Robertson itself, but as explained by Goodhart, is part of the ratio
in Gargaro and Lewis. 132
128. The Harvard Law Review argued that the Court used "reasoning of doubtful validity to escape
applying the claim of right doctrine" in Gargaro, stating that: in "cases like the present one, where the
earnings or dividends are actually repaid, most courts apply the North American dictum in all its rigor,
taxing the recipient when he obtains the funds and allowing him the cold comfort of a possible
deduction when he loses them. . . Justification for this result is found in the annual system; federal
revenue cannot wait until final determination of the rights of all claimants."; Income Tax - What is
Income - Taxpayer Allowed Refund of the Tax Paid on Profit Sharing, 61 HAR. L. REV. 710, 711
(1948).
129. Gargaro, 73 F. Supp. at 974.
130. Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
131. Gargaro, 73 F. Supp. at 975. Judge Whitaker in the minority in Gargaro and Lewis v. United
States, and the Sixth Circuit in Haberkorn v. United States noted that the finding in Wilcox was that,
unlike in the instant cases, the embezzler had not received the money under any claim of right because
at the time he embezzled the money he was at all times under an unqualified duty and obligation to
repay the money. Id. at 976 (Whitaker, dissenting); Lewis, 91 F. Supp. at 1022 (Whitaker, dissenting);
Haberkorn, 78 F. Supp. at 194.
132. Goodhart, supra note 59. Conversely this means that the Supreme Court judgment overturning
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Finally, both Gargaro and Lewis were cases in which the reversal
transaction was legally connected to the original transaction (and gave rise
to an outgoing that was deductible in its own right) so they cannot be
authority for the application of the unwind doctrine to bare reversals, as
apparently blessed by Rev. Rul. 80-58. In each case, there was a "definite,
unconditional obligation" on the taxpayer to refund the excess part of his
bonus.' A legal infirmity in the original transaction meant that the
repayment was legally connected to the overpayment of the bonus itself.
The repayment was not a fresh, bare reversal.
In sum, Gargaro and Lewis form a line of authority, now seemingly
extinguished by the Supreme Court' 34 distinct from the unwind doctrine in
Rev. Rul. 80-58. The majority relied on a general principle of justice to
find that, sometimes, when a taxpayer refunds an over payment he can
reopen a past year's assessment. The "unwind doctrine" merely requires a
reversal by the end of the tax year, with no justice considerations attached
and applies only to reversals that take place within the same tax year.
B. MENTIONS OF PENN v. ROBERTSON IN DICTA
In the following three cases, the courts suggest that the unwind
doctrine may exist, but they are only dicta on that point because in each
case the court finds as a matter of fact the parties have not been returned to
the status quo ante. The dicta is only weak support for the interpretation of
Penn v. Robertson in Rev. Rul. 80-58 because the cases are also vague
about whether returning to the economic status quo ante within the tax year
is the only requirement necessary to grant an unwind, or whether the return
to the status quo ante must be effected by a transaction that is a true
rescission. In each case the taxpayer had in fact tried unsuccessfully to
argue that there had been a true rescission.
1. In Re Trico Marine Services
In Trico, the plaintiffs alleged that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan had
been procured by fraud, and asked the court to revoke the plan.' 35 The
court held that it was impossible to do so because bankruptcy law requires
for the valid revocation of a Chapter 11 plan that all relevant parties be
restored to the status quo ante, but this was impossible on the facts.' 36 In
particular, the court found that it was impossible to restore the tax positions
the claims court in Lewis is not an explicit judicial rejection of the unwind doctrine interpretation of
Penn v. Robertson, because no such doctrine or interpretation was relied upon hy the Claims Court.
133. Haberkorn, 78 F. Supp. at 193.
I134. See generally Lewis, 340 U.S. 590.




of the parties to the status quo ante.137
The plaintiffs had argued that it was indeed possible to restore the
parties' tax positions, because tax unwind treatment could and should be
applied to the proposed revocation of the Chapter 11 plan.' 3 8 Responding
to this submission, the court cited Penn v. Robertson and Rev. Rul. 80-58
by way of obiter dictum, suggesting that it accepted that in theory tax
unwind treatment may sometimes be available:'
Where property is sold or conveyed, and the transaction is then
rescinded, the rescission does not undo the tax effect of the initial
transaction unless two factors are present. First, the rescission must
occur in the same tax year as the initial transaction. Penn v. Robertson.. .
Rev. Rul. 80-58. . . . Second, the parties to the transaction must be
returned to the status quo ante.
The court found however that it was impossible in the case before it to
return the parties to the status quo ante, because doing so would require
tracing all the shares issued under the Chapter 11 plan, which the plaintiff
conceded would be "very difficult, if not impossible." 40
Because the court did not sanction tax unwind treatment in this case,
Trico gives no firm basis for either the unwind doctrine or its application to
bare reversals. Even as dicta, Trico is weak support for the interpretation
of Penn v. Robertson in Rev. Rul. 80-58 for other reasons.
The court did not unambiguously adopt the unwind doctrine, even by
way of obiter dictum. It said that "[w]here property is sold or conveyed,
and the transaction is then rescinded, the rescission does not undo the tax
effect of the initial transaction unless two factors are present."'41 "Undo the
tax effect" could simply be a statement that the tax effect of a rescission
can cancel the tax effect of the original transaction, if both tax effects are
independently recognized.
The court did not analyze Penn v. Robertson or refer to the facts in
that case. When it did refer to Penn v. Robertson, it simultaneously cited
Rev. Rul. 80-58,142 so any of the court's dicta comments about tax unwinds
could just be an interpretation of Rev. Rul. 80-58 or an independent
understanding by the court of Penn v. Robertson.
Finally, the plaintiffs sought to apply unwind treatment not to a bare
reversal, but to a true rescission. The plaintiffs urged that the Chapter 11
plan be revoked because it had been procured by fraud.' 43 That is, they
argued that there was a legal infirmity in the original transactions.
137. In re Trico, 343 B.R. 68 at 72-73.
138. Id. at 71-72.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id. at 73.
142. In re Trico, 343 B.R. 68 at 73.
143. Id. at 70.
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2. Scallen v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue
Scallen was a tax professor at the University of Minnesota who was
also involved in the real estate business.144 In January 1979, Blue Ridge,
Inc. (controlled by the Scallen) sold the Brittany Apartments to Mr.
Hansen. Hansen then sold the Brittany Apartments to Mr. Herman. In
November 1979, Mr. Herman sold the Brittany Apartments to Campus
Realty, Inc., another company controlled by the Scallen. Scallen argued
that the November sale of the Brittany Apartments should be treated as a
"rescission" of the January contract. The court said:145
Section 1001(c) provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subtitle [A], the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this
section, on the sale or exchanged of property shall be recognized. No
gain shall be recognized, however, if in the year of sale, the sale is
rescinded and the taxpayer accepts reconveyance of the property and
returns the buyer's funds. Penn v. Robertso . . .
The court found that "we do not agree that a rescission occurred on the
facts." 46 Neither of the parties to the January transaction were the same as
the parties to the November transaction. The court declined to disregard
the corporate form to treat both Blue Ridge, Inc., and Campus Realty, Inc.,
as acting as agents for the Scallen, and "even assuming an agency for
[Scallen] existed through both corporations, we are still addressing a
different 'other' party in each contract, i.e., Hansen in the January contract
and Herman in the November contract."1 47  There was no reason to
disregard the transfer from Hansen to Herman.
Because the court did not apply unwind treatment, its statements
suggesting that the unwind doctrine might exist are dicta. Furthermore, the
court does not address, even in dicta, the question of whether any unwind
treatment can be applied to pure reversals that put the parties in the status
quo ante, or only true rescissions. Finally, although the court cites Penn v.
Robertson as authority for the unwind doctrine it appears to take this
authority for granted. It does not work through the judges' reasoning in
Penn to explain how the case can be taken for authority for the unwind
doctrine, a task that would have been impossible, as this article explains.
C. OTHER WEAK DICTA - HUTCHESON
Hutcheson'4 8 is a case that discusses the unwind treatment in Rev. Rul.





148. Hutcheson, 71 T.('.M. (CCH) 2425.
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The taxpayer in 1998 asked the broker Merrill Lynch to sell some of
the taxpayer's stock in the company Wal-Mart. Merrill Lynch sold 96,600
more shares than client thought he had advised should be sold. 4 9 Later that
year Merrill Lynch purchased with funds contributed by Merrill Lynch and
the client 96,600 shares in Wal-Mart (the shares had in meanwhile gone up
in price). 5 0
The taxpayer argued that Rev. Rul. 80-58 applied so as to allow him to
recognize no gain on the original sale of the 96,000 shares sold
erroneously, because the later purchase of Wal-Mart shares had
"rescinded" that sale.15'
The court held that the situation did not meet the requirement of Rev.
Rul. 80-58 that "both buyer and seller must be put back in their original
positions." 52 In the first transaction Merrill Lynch was acting as agent and
in the second had acted as purchaser in its own right. Furthermore, the
96,000 shares purchased were purchased from different parties, and were
different shares, from the 96,000 shares sold.' 5
The case did not cite Penn v. Robertson; the taxpayer's argument
appeared to be exclusively that he could rely on Rev. Rul. 80-58. The court
denied that such reliance was appropriate, and did not consider whether
Rev. Rul. 80-58 was correct. 154
D. BARE REVERSALS DENIED UNWIND
None of the cases discussed above explicitly and authoritatively make
the same mistakes in interpreting Penn v. Robertson as the IRS made in
Rev. Rul. 80-58, namely pronouncing it authority for an unwind doctrine
that applies to bare reversals.
By contrast, there is clear case authority consistent with the orthodox
view that where there are two transactions that economically nullify each
other within the same tax year, each transaction must be given its separate
tax effect. Crelilin's Estate and Branum v. Campbell are two cases where
the courts were asked to apply unwind treatment to bare reversals that
returned the parties to the economic status quo ante within the tax year. In
these cases, the courts explicitly rejected the approach of ignoring both the
original transaction and its reversal-as would be consistent with Rev. Rul.
80-58's misinterpretation of Penn v. Robertson-and instead recognized
the independent tax impacts of the two separate transactions.
149. Hutcheson, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2425 at 1-2.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id.
154. Even if the court had thought that the ruling was incorrect, the taxpayer may have been able to
rely on it nevertheless if he had been able to bring himself within the requirements of the ruling. See
discussion infra Part VI.
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In both Crellin's Estate and Branum v. Campbell the taxpayer derived
income from one transaction, and later reversed that transaction. However,
the outgoing in the reversal was not deductible in its own right.
In each case, the court was emphatic that each transaction would be
recognized for tax purposes and given its independent tax effect, even
though the taxpayer had been returned economically to the status quo ante.
The transactions could not be ignored, nor was there any special rule that
made the second transaction-not deductible in its own right-deductible
simply because it economically reversed an earlier transaction.
Neither case mentions Penn v. Robertson. Perhaps this is unsurprising
if Penn v. Robertson does simply stand for the ordinary proposition that a
deduction can be set off against taxable income in the same tax year. The
courts in Crellin 's Estate and Branum v. Campbell may have thought this
proposition so uncontroversial and established that no such citation of Penn
v. Robertson or of any other cases was required on this point.
1. Crellin's Estate v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue
The taxpayers in Crellin 's Estate' were shareholders of a company
that realized a capital gain. The companys accountant advised the
company that the gain would be subject to the personal holding company
surtax unless the gain was distributed.' On the advice of the accountant
the company's directors declared a dividend in 1946 equal to the amount of
the capital gain.' 57  Later that year the directors learned that the
accountant's advice had been wrong and, therefore, passed a resolution
purporting to rescind the dividend."'
The IRS argued that the payment of a dividend and its voluntary
return later that year should be treated as two separate transactions, with
each given their independent tax effect: The dividend should be taxable
because it was received under a claim of right, and the return of the
dividend should be treated as an entirely voluntary, nondeductible
contribution of capital.'"9 The taxpayers' position was that the dividend
payments should not form part of their gross income for the year 1946, the
dividend having been both received and returned in that year.160 The court
stated the question before it in this way: "Did the action of the directors in
attempting to rescind the dividend and the repayment of the stockholders in
the year the dividends were declared and received (1946) change the
character of the dividend payments so as to authorize their exclusion from
155. 203 F.2d 812.
1 56 . Id. at 813.
I157. Id.
15 8. Id.




the gross income of petitioners?"16 '
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument and held for the IRS The
court stated that taxable income arises in the year in which a dividend is
received under a claim of right, and that in this case, it was clear that the
taxpayer had received the dividend under a claim of right.162 The court said
that a deduction arises in the year in which a dividend is repaid subject to a
legal compulsion to repay.63 Therefore:164
[The taxpayers'] contention that the amounts of the dividend payments
were not a part of their respective gross incomes for the year 1946, the
dividend having been both received and returned in that year, is therefore
valid if the repayment could have been required. It is the year in which a
legally rescindable dividend is returned that determines when the
deduction from gross income may be taken.
By footnote to this passage, the court said that "when payment and
return of the dividend occur within the same taxable year, it is reasonable
to view the transaction as involving no increment to gross income, rather
than an increment to gross income plus a deduction."' 5 However, this is a
legitimate way to view the outcome if and only if the return of the dividend
was required by law-i.e., deductible in its own right. Furthermore, this
was not the court's preferred characterization, but the characterization
proposed by the taxpayers. That is, the court noted that the outcome is the
same under the deduction rationale and the conflation rationale in
circumstances where the outgoing is deductible in its own right.
The court was unequivocal that in cases where an outgoing is not
deductible in its own right: Just because it economically undoes another
transaction earlier in the tax year, the outgoing cannot be treated as
deductible, or otherwise nullifying or "changing the character of' the
original taxable receipt. "On the other hand, a so-called 'rescission' which
does not have the force and effect in law of compelling the return of
payments made under a dividend declaration, but which in reality is a
voluntary act, cannot create a deduction in any year."l 6 6
The court also made plain that in trying to determine whether an
outgoing paid in reversal of an earlier transaction is deductible, it is the
substance of that second transaction that matters, not the label given to it by
the parties: "Substance prevails over form. The consent given by [the
taxpayers] and relied upon by them as justifying 'rescission' was in fact no
more than a voluntary payment by stockholders." 67




165. Id. at 814 n.1.
166. Id. at 814.
167. Id. at 815.
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2. Branum v. Campbell
In Branum v. Campbell the taxpayer in 1948 sold a half interest in his
business (forming a partnership with the purchaser) and then repurchased
the half interest later that year for the same amount (dissolving the
partnership).' The Commissioner treated the gain on the original sale as
having given rise to net income, with the repurchase being a "separate
transaction which resulted in the taxpayer's obtaining an increased basis in
one-half of his business, but which had no effect on the taxable status of the
gain realized from the original sale."" 9 The taxpayer, by contrast, sought
to report no taxable gain on the sale of the business at all. The court found
that: "the words and tenor of the contract are definite. There is no
reservation of title and no indication of a conditional or provisional
agreement between the parties. By its terms, a sale of one-half of the
business was accomplished and a partnership formed." 70
The court concluded that "there was a completed sale, which was a
separate and distinct transaction . . . and that the gain realized upon the sale
was properly included in the taxpayer's gross income as a capital gain.""
Although the transactions economically cancelled each other they were
legally separate, each transaction was given its independent tax effect.
Commentary has implied that the taxpayer's argument might have
fared better had the unwind transaction been "styled as a rescission."" 2
However, Crellin 's Estate above suggests that even if the taxpayer in
Branum v. Campbell had labeled the repurchase of his partnership interest a
"rescission" of the original sale, the court would have looked beyond the
label to the substance1 73 which in this case was not a true rescission but, as
the court noted, "separate and distinct."1 74
VI. TAXPAYER RELIANCE ON MISTAKEN REVENUE RULINGS
The forgoing has shown that there is no decisive judicial authority for
the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-58 or its application to bare reversals,
either in Penn v. Robertson itself or in any subsequent case law interpreting




172. Schnabel, supra note 4, at 700.
173. Crellin's Estate, 203 F.2d at 814.
174. Relying on Branum v. Campbell, the court in Reeves v. United States, also treated the
repurchase of the taxpayer's business interests as a separate and distinct transaction from the original
sale, nothing that in the original sale there was no "conditional or provisional agreement" and it was a
transfer "without reservation." 173 F. Supp. 779, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1959). In Reeves however, the court
also noted that the reversal transaction did not put the taxpayer in the status quo ante, as in the second
transaction, the taxpayer purchased more of the business than he had sold in the original sale
transaction, and the sale price also reimbursed the taxpayer for other expenses.
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Penn v. Robertson. On the contrary, in cases like Branum v. Campbell
where the issue has been before the court, the judges have held, in effect,
that there is no unwind doctrine in the form in which Rev. Rul. 80-58 and
private letter rulings present it.
This conclusion has significant practical implications. Taxpayers
routinely rely on Rev. Rul. 80-58 to reach tax results that they could not
otherwise attain.1 5 Can they continue to do so, even if Rev. Rul. 80-58 is
mistaken and there is no authority in the Code, Treasury Regulations, or
case law for the approach that it takes? Importantly, when a taxpayer has
relied upon an incorrect revenue ruling, is the Commissioner estopped from
arguing that the ruling should be disregarded because it is incorrect in law?
The answer is unclear.
The departure point is the frequently quoted passage from Beneficial
Foundation, Inc. v. United States, "[so] long as a published ruling is not
revoked or modified, it may be invoked by any taxpayer as if it were issued
to him personally, and to the extent that it addresses issues in his case, the
ruling will normally be dispositive."176
Some commentaries on the issue begin and end with that quotation.177
The case contains this comment, by way of an easily overlooked footnote
to the above quotation:178
The court leaves for future consideration whether circumstances exist
where it may be appropriate to overturn a published ruling favouring a
taxpayer at the behest of the Service. In this case, defendant has not
asked the court to overturn the published rulings in question, apparently
taking the position that the court ought simply to ignore them. To ignore
published rulings is, however, tantamount to overturning them because
rulings can provide no guidance to taxpayers if the Service and the courts
fail to give them effect in litigation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision in Automobile Club of
Michigan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue has been interpreted by
other courts to stand for a "well established rule that the Commissioner
may retroactively revoke certain revenue rulings, even where taxpayers
may have relied on them to their detriment." 79
175. Branum, 211 F.2d at 148.
176. 8 CI.Ct. 639, 645 (1985). See commentary in, for example, CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 47A
INTERNAL REVENUE, §9 n.81.
177. See CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM,supra note 175.
178. Beneficial Found., 8 Cl. Ct. at 645 n.7.
179. See Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024 n.15 (5th Cir. 1998).
Note that in cases where the I.R.S. has tried in vain to argue that a Revenue Ruling is dispositive, the
courts have clearly and repeatedly stated that Revenue Rulings:
do not have the force or effect of regulations or Treasury decisions much less that of law,
are at most persuasive, and are not binding on a court. These cases state that when a court
finds that the statutory interpretation embodied in a ruling is erroneous, it must substitute
its judgment for that of the service.
See CORPUS JUJRIS SECUNDUM, 47A INTERNAL REVENUE, §9 nn. 79 80.
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Another line of cases relying on Silco v. United States' has held that
Automobile Club of Michigan applies only where the Commissioner
revokes a ruling that is "clearly" contrary to the Code: 8 1
Silco stands for the proposition that the Commissioner will be held to his
published rulings in areas where the law is unclear, and may not depart
from them in individual cases. Furthermore, under Silco the
Commissioner may not retroactively abrogate a ruling in an unclear area
with respect to any taxpayer who has relied on it.
The cases relying on Silco emphasize Treasury Regulations that had
not been promulgated when Automobile Club of Michigan was decided.' 8 2
Those Treasury Regulations (601.101(3)(92)(v)(e)) currently state:
Taxpayers generally may rely upon Revenue Rulings published in the
Bulletin in determining the tax treatment of their own transactions and
need not request specific rulings applying the principles of a published
Revenue Ruling to the facts of their particular cases. However, since
each Revenue Ruling represents the conclusion of the Service as to the
application of the law to the entire state of facts involved, taxpayers,
Service personnel, and others concerned are cautioned against reaching
the same conclusion in other cases unless the facts and circumstances are
substantially the same. They should consider the effect of subsequent
legislation, regulations, court decisions, and revenue rulings.
The regulation states only that taxpayers "generally" may rely upon
revenue rulings, leaving open the possibility that in some circumstances
reliance is inappropriate, but without enumerating those circumstances.
The Commissioner appears to have open to him an argument that,
under Silco, he is entitled to ignore Rev. Rul. 80-58 on the basis that the
ruling was clearly incorrect because of the Service's misinterpretation of
Penn v. Robertson. A case of "clear" mistake of law might be one of the
circumstances in which the Treasury Regulations anticipate that on revenue
rulings cannot be relied upon by taxpayers.
The authors do not attempt to resolve this issue, but it is perhaps not as
easily disposed of as some may believe. Mr. Poling and others in his
position should not simply assume that Rev. Rul. 80-58 saves them from a
daunting tax result.
180. 779 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1986).
181. McLendon, 135 F.3d at 1024.
182. Id. atl1024 n.15.
183. The Treasury Regulations are equivocal relative to, for example, the New Zealand Tax
Administration Act 1994 section 91 DB which has the clear effect that New Zealand taxpayers may rely
upon public rulings even when the rulings are clearly wrong: "(1) Notwithstanding anything in any
other Act, if -(a) a public ruling on a taxation law applies to a person in relation to an arrangement;
and (h) the person applies the taxation law in the way stated in the ruling, -the Commissioner must
apply the taxation law in relation to the person and the arrangement in accordance with the ruling.' Tax
Administration Act 1994 § 91DB (N.L.).
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VII. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
We have found that the unwind doctrine in Rev. Rul. 80-58 has no
judicial authority, and the ability of taxpayers to continue to rely on the
mistaken revenue ruling is uncertain.
The IRS should revoke its mistaken ruling, or to the extent that any
ambiguity in the ruling allows it to be applied in ways that are not legally
correct, should correct that ambiguity. The Treasury Regulations state that
"the purpose of publishing revenue rulings . . . is to promote correct and
uniform application of the tax laws by Internal Revenue Service employees
and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance."1 84
Rev. Rul. 80-58 currently violates this regulation because it promulgates an
incorrect interpretation of the tax law set out in Penn v. Robertson.18 1
If Rev. Rul. 80-58 were revoked, taxpayers could perhaps continue tax
unwinding, taking the position that the Code gives implicit authority for the
unwind doctrine, irrespective of whether Penn v. Robertson recognized it.
Taxpayers and practitioners wishing to continue unwinding might further
persuade the IRS to issue a new revenue ruling, or Treasury to issue an
interpretive regulation to the effect that the unwind doctrine exists and may
be applied to bare reversals, despite the lack of case law supporting it. This
approach has two weaknesses. The first is that the case law has explicitly
rejected interpreting the Code to allow unwinding. Cases such as Crellin 's
Estate and Branum v. Campbell discussed above rejected the application of
an unwind approach to bare reversals. In the face of such cases, the courts
might hold that any subsequent, contradictory regulation or rulings would
be an impermissible construction of the statute. 186 The approach of relying
on the Code as it stands to support unwinding also has the weakness that
there would be no certainty until the approach is tested by the courts.
For those reasons, it would be sensible for taxpayers and practitioners
who wish to continue to use unwinding to seek an explicit amendment to
the Code that allows unwind treatment in the case of bare reversals.
Policymakers responding to such a request would have to decide
whether to create an unwind doctrine that applies to bare reversals. Below
we canvass existing principles of tax law and other policy considerations
relevant to this question.
184. Internal Revenue Statement of Procedural Rules 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (2009).
185. While section 7805(b) gives the I.R.S. some discretion in enforcing the code, Revenue Ruling
80-58 does not purport to rely on discretion. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
186. Here, we do not consider in detail the validity of such a regulation considering such factors as
Chevron. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843
(1984).
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A. PRINCIPLES OF TAX LAW
When considering whether to legislatively recognize an unwind
doctrine with application to bare reversals, policymakers should consider
whether such a doctrine would be consistent with or required by existing
principles of tax law. In the authors' view, the unwind doctrine does not
seem currently tethered to existing principle.
Schnabel has claimed that the unwind doctrine is simply a "modest
variation of the claim of right doctrine."' 87 In the authors' view the unwind
doctrine is not a natural extension of the claim of right doctrine. The
unwind doctrine applies even in cases (such as Poling's) where there was
no doubt about the legal basis of the taxpayer's right to keep the receipt,'
and that the reversal of that receipt was not due to some infirmity in the
taxpayer's claim to the amount received.'
Similarly, the principles of general justice applied in cases such as
Gargaro and Lewis discussed above do not extend to all cases to which the
unwind doctrine has been applied.' 90 Judges may be sympathetic to the
argument that Poling returned their bonuses because of the strong public
feeling that this was the correct thing to do morally, and should not face a
net negative tax consequence this morally laudable action. Appeals to
general notions of justice are unlikely, however, to be sustained in other
cases to which the unwind doctrine has applied, such as cases where the
reversal has been precipitated by unwise management decisions or the
taxpayer's regret about the tax consequences of the original transaction.191
Considerations of justice in Gargaro and Lewis would seem to allow
unwind treatment only in cases only where the unwind has moral value.'92
This would allow unwind in a narrower class of cases than the unwind
doctrine, which has been applied irrespective of the motivation for the
reversal.193
Perhaps the most promising principled basis for the unwind doctrine is
the idea that tax law should follow economic substance,194 coupled with the
tax year accounting principle in Saunders v. Commissioner.'95 Perhaps tax
187. Shnabel, supra note 4, at 688-689.
188. See supra Part II.
189. In claim of right cases section 1341 may apply; see Lee, supra note 40, at 330 n.21.
190. Assuming that courts could be persuaded to consider this approach at all, given the Supreme
Court's rejection of it in Lewis, see supra text accompanying note 134.
191. The situations in, respectively, I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005) and I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 07-01-019 (Jan. 5, 2007).
192. See discussion supra Part V.A.
193. Lee, supra note 40, canvasses a number of other approaches and principles that might result in
the same outcome as the unwind doctrine, but does not argue that these approaches form the principled
bases for the unwind doctrine.
194. Reflected in many attempts by tax law to follow economic substance, including judicial
development of the economic substance doctrine and enactment of section 17709(o).
195. See generaly 101 F.2d 407.
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law should strive, where possible, to base legal outcomes on the net change
in taxpayers economic positions during the tax year, ignoring interim
changes in legal and economic position. A uniform application of this
principle however would have implications somewhat more radical than
allowing taxpayers to claim unwind treatment at their discretion; it would
require that treatment in every relevant case, and would further indicated a
broader move towards reporting of net tax positions only at year end.
Furthermore, it is not clear that an economic substance approach
would necessarily support the unwind doctrine. Hasen, in Unwinding
Unwinding, created a theoretical framework for analyzing "unwind"
cases. 19 6  Hasen attempted to derive from the Haig-Simons economic
income concept principles for whether and when unwinding should be
allowed.197 Hasen argued that "the substantive case for unwinding
treatment is comparatively weak" in situations where income tax
consequences are being unwound, as compared to situations where
transactional taxes are being unwound.'98 The crux of his thesis is that: 199
... the existence of the thing that is taxed-income-does not depend on
the fact of a transaction. Rather, the transaction provides the occasion
for imposing the tax now rather than at some other time; the income (or
loss), however, will generally be taken into account eventually. Hence
the availability of the unwind treatment should not depend, even in the
abstract, on the mere return to the status quo ante, because such a return
does not mean that nothing giving rise to a tax has occurred.
Hasen concludes that "any reversal, to merit unwind treatment, ought
to be allowed only if the mistake or error giving rise to it is justified."200
This is again a narrow principle than the current unwind doctrine.
There may be other principles of tax law that suggest that unwinding
has some basis in existing tax law approaches. We are not aware of any
compelling detailed analysis that argues this is the case. Instead the basis
for the unwind doctrine to date seems to be simply the assertion that Penn
v. Robertson is authority for it.
B. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Banoff canvasses a number of policy arguments both for and against
permitting retroactive unwinding. 201 The arguments against include that
"approval of retroactive unwindings that are tax motivated permits
taxpayers to play the audit lottery: If you are audited, only then do you
196. Hasen, supra note 2.
197. Id. at 895-905.
198. Id. at 943.
199. Id. at 874.
200. Id. at 943.
201. Banoff, supra note 17, at 6.
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unwind to avoid adverse tax results."202 The unwind doctrine may similarly
dilute the deterrent effect of the codified economic substance doctrine in
sectionl17709(o) by allowing taxpayers to undertake transactions that may
risk falling foul of that doctrine knowing that they can be rescinded later in
the tax year if they receive advice that it would certainly fall foul of
sectionl17709(o). Hasen further notes that the ability to unwind transactions
in the manner allowed by Rev. Rul. 80-58 facilitates the problem of
government "whipsaw," when the property transferred subject to an
"unwinding has depreciated or depreciated over the course of the tax year."203
Each of these effects may mean that unwinding is a drain on the revenue.
Banoff's list of policy arguments in favour of the unwind doctrine
include that "tax law should be interpreted reasonably and mirror
commercial reasonableness. It is commercially reasonably for people in
business to have a transaction remain open' for economic purposes. Thus
the tax law should reflect flexibility to recognize unwinding as of the
original transaction." 204
A further policy consideration is the transition cost of eliminating
unwinding. Given the large structure of tax practice now built upon the
mistaken interpretation of the unwind doctrine, perhaps now it would be
too costly and difficult to eliminate the unwind doctrine. Mitigating this
consideration is that any IRS or legislative clarification that there is no
current basis in law for unwinding could be promulgated with prospective
effect only. Because the unwind doctrine applies only to transactions that
reverse each other within the same tax year, there would be no need for
grandfathering or other complicated transition rules.
C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT POLicY RESPONSES
The brief review above of policy considerations does not
unequivocally establish that the unwind doctrine should exist, even if it is
not currently supported by case law. An unwind doctrine of the same
scope as set out in Rev. Rul. 80-58 and subsequent practice is not clearly
supported by existing principles of tax law, and policy considerations point
in both directions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The unwind doctrine is the result of a simple mistake. The mistake
was for the IRS, practitioners, and commentators to treat Penn v. Robertson
as standing for a principle that could explain the outcome of the case, rather
202. Banoff, supra note 17, at 6.
203. Hasen, supra note 2, at 941.
204. Banoff, supra note 17, at 6.
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than the principle that accurately described the reasoning of the judges.205
Two rationales are consistent with the result in Penn v. Robertson: (1)
that a taxable gain and a deduction may offset each other when they occur
in the same tax year; or (2) that two transactions that cancel each other
economically and occur in the same tax year may be conflated and treated
as a nullity. We have found in Part III above that only the deduction
rationale accurately describes the reasoning of the judges in the Penn v.
Robertson, and is the ratio decidendi of the case.206
The mistake matters (and is useful for taxpayers) in cases where
ordinary principles of tax law would not lead to the same result as the
unwind doctrine. These are cases in which the unwind transaction is not
legally connected to the original transaction, such as, under the facts we
assume, the situation of some TARP bonus recipients who repaid their
bonuses. 207
Judges, however, have not yet made the same mistake, and taxpayers
would not be wise to rely on the unwind doctrine in the face of it lacking a
firm basis in case law.208 Policymakers should therefore be asked to decide
whether there is some tax principle or economic or policy rationale that
justifies ratifying the mistaken interpretation of Penn v. Robertson by
independently creating an unwind doctrine. 209 The choice for policymakers
is not clear cut. Existing principles of tax law do not unequivocally support
the adoption of an unwind doctrine, and policy considerations point in
different directions.210 While the mistake that led to the fabricated unwind
doctrine becoming a part of tax practice was simple, deciding what to do
about it is likely to be much more complicated.
205. See supra Part III.
206. Id.
207. See supra Part IV.
208. See supra Parts V and VI.
209. See supra Part VII.
210. Id.
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